

# The Quality Teacher and Education Act: First Year Report

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# Overview of research


- This report presents findings from the first year of a three-year study on the implementation and effect of the Quality Teacher and Education Act (QTEA) in San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD).
- This study follows a 3-stage analytic process:
  - Document the passage of QTEA\*
  - Research QTEA's implementation
  - Evaluate the effect of QTEA
- This report presents findings from the first year of implementation (2009-10).
  - The focus of the research featured in this report is first year implementation, but we also provide a brief overview of implementation in the 2010-11 and 2011-12 school years for reference.

\*This phase of the work has been completed. For a case study narrative of the passage of QTEA, see <http://gse.berkeley.edu/research/pace/reports/WP.09-4.pdf>; for a policy brief on the lessons learned from the process, see <http://gse.berkeley.edu/research/pace/reports/PB.09-2.pdf>

# The Quality Teacher & Education Act

## *Proposition A of 2008*

- QTEA is a parcel tax passed by San Francisco voters in June 2008 by a 69.8% vote.
- QTEA authorizes the city to collect an annual tax of \$198\* per parcel of taxable property for 20 years. **Focus of research**



\*As passed - the actual number is adjusted annually.

# QTEA changes in 2010-11 & 2011-12

- Some QTEA funds were reapportioned to protect teacher jobs:
  - Funds were used to help fill an estimated shortfall through 2011-12 of \$113 million.
  - Before the agreement to use QTEA funds to fill budget gaps, 811 initial staff layoff notices were sent. However, once the agreement was reached only 195 teachers received final notices.
- Most program elements remain intact:
  - Across-the-board salary increases, hard-to-staff school bonuses, and changes to Peer Assistance and Review were unchanged.
  - Retention and hard-to-fill subject bonuses, the Master Teacher program, and Whole-School Rewards were reduced by half.
  - PD hours were completely reapportioned to save PD cut by the state.
- Postponement of full implementation presents opportunity:
  - As designed, QTEA had no implementation year.
  - Postponement may allow for reflection and program improvement.
  - After being restored, 16 years of QTEA implementation remain.

# QTEA implementation through 2011-12

QTEA Element	As Designed	2009-10	Program Changes for 2010-11 & 2011-12
Across-the-board salary increases	Step increases range from \$500 to \$6,300	(No change)	(No change)
Retention bonus	\$2,500 after 4 years \$3,000 after 8 years	(No change)	Reduced by half (\$1,500 after 4 years, \$1,500 after 8 years)
Bonus for teaching in hard-to-fill (HTF) subjects	\$1000 per year	Math, Science, Bilingual, SPED	Reduced by half (\$500 per year); SPED only for incoming teachers
Bonus for teaching in hard-to-staff (HTS) schools	\$2000 per year	25 schools	25 schools; 4 changed
Prop A Professional Development (PD) Hours	18 additional hours per year	(No change)	Reallocated funds to maintain 3 staff PD days
Master Teacher (MT) Program	50 teachers with 0.2 release time	3 full time, 12 "Demonstration", 8 with 0.2 release	Program reduced by half (only "Demonstration" MTs)
Whole-School Rewards	20 schools showing most improvement receive \$30,000	Program not implemented	Program reduced by half; not yet implemented
Peer Assistance and Review (PAR) program	Easier entry, harder exit, no re-entry, voluntary participation (more coaches)	(No change)	(No change)

# Primary study considerations

- District-level implementation:
  - How were policy elements refined after QTEA's passage?
  - In the first year of implementation, how was QTEA implemented at the district level?
  - Did first year policy implementation serve QTEA's intended goals?
- QTEA in schools:
  - How was QTEA operationalized in schools?
  - Were principals, teachers, and applicants aware of QTEA's changes?
  - Are they satisfied with QTEA's reforms?
- Effect on outcomes:
  - What was QTEA's effect on hypothesized outcomes in this first year of implementation?
- Lessons from first year implementation:
  - What are barriers to QTEA's successful implementation?
  - How can SFUSD improve implementation in upcoming years?

# Hypothesized outcomes in the effect of QTEA

	Recruitment	Retention	Voluntary Transfer to HTS schools	Improvement of Entire Workforce	Rehabilitation and Removal of Low-Performing Teachers
<b>I</b>	Salary & Bonuses	X	X	X	
<b>II</b>	Increased PD		X		X
<b>III</b>	Master Teachers		X		X
<b>IV</b>	Whole-School Rewards		X		X
<b>V</b>	Changes to PAR				X

- In the first year, this study will focus on short-term indicators of effectiveness.
  - Teacher and principal reports
- In additional study years, we can investigate effect on long-term indicators.
  - Teacher retention, teacher quality, student achievement



# Methodological approach

	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12
Analysis of administrative data	X	X	X	X	X
Surveys	X*		X	X	X
Interviews with district staff and stakeholders		X	X	X	X
School case studies			X		

\*This survey was conducted by The New Teacher Project (2009); we build on their results in our analyses.

# Methodological approach:

## *Analysis of administrative data*

Database includes school years 2000-01 through 2009-10

<b>Student data</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>□ Demographics</li><li>□ Instructional Time</li><li>□ Performance</li><li>□ Links (unique student, teacher/classroom)</li></ul>	<b>Teacher data</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>□ Teaching assignment</li><li>□ Demographics</li><li>□ Receipt of salary and bonus</li><li>□ Teaching experience</li><li>□ Teacher evaluations</li><li>□ Links (unique teacher, school identification number)</li></ul>
<b>Applications and positions Data</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>□ Listing of open positions</li><li>□ Applicants by year</li><li>□ Teacher transfers</li><li>□ Separations</li></ul>	<b>Publicly available school data</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>□ API ranking</li><li>□ Student proficiency levels on standardized tests</li><li>□ Aggregate student demographics</li><li>□ Aggregate teacher characteristics</li></ul>

# Methodological approach<sup>1</sup>: *Surveys*<sup>2</sup>

For comparative purposes, surveys include items from a survey administered in 2008 by The New Teacher Project (Tntp)<sup>3</sup>.

<p><b>Principal survey</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Sample: 105 (Population)</li> <li>■ Incentives: N/A</li> <li>■ Response rate: 83%</li> <li>■ Survey procedure: Invitation sent on 4/30/10 via email to take web-based survey; email (to addresses on file) and paper notifications (sent to schools) sent through 5/14/10.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Teacher survey</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Sample: 3116 (Population)</li> <li>■ Incentives: 50 \$150 prizes</li> <li>■ Response rate: 53%</li> <li>■ Survey procedure: Invitation sent on 4/30/10 via email to take web-based survey; email (to addresses on file) and paper notifications (sent to school) sent through 5/20/10.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Applicant survey</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Sample: 1600 (randomly sampled from population of 5180)</li> <li>■ Incentives: 1/10 respondents win \$99</li> <li>■ Response rate: 49%</li> <li>■ Survey procedure: Invitation sent on 7/20/10 via email to take web-based survey; email (to addresses on file) sent through 8/11/10.</li> </ul>	

1. For detail on 2010 survey respondents, see the Appendix.
2. 1. The actual survey instruments can be found online at:  
 Principal: [http://suse.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV\\_6r2xdGWMprjs8Pa&Preview=Survey&BrandID=suse](http://suse.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_6r2xdGWMprjs8Pa&Preview=Survey&BrandID=suse)  
 Teacher: [http://suse.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV\\_3KjOwbfuWNudn6c&Preview=Survey&BrandID=suse](http://suse.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_3KjOwbfuWNudn6c&Preview=Survey&BrandID=suse)  
 Applicant: [http://suse.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV\\_enyG4W3uYRv5d9G&Preview=Survey&BrandID=suse](http://suse.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_enyG4W3uYRv5d9G&Preview=Survey&BrandID=suse)
2. Response rates for the 2008 Tntp surveys were 31% for teachers, 79% for principals, and 32% for applicants. For more details on survey administration, see The New Teacher Project (2009).

# Methodological approach:

## *Interviews*

- Interviews with district leaders and stakeholders:
  - 16 respondents, interviewed multiple times
- School case studies:
  - 10 schools\*: 2 elementary, 1 K-8, 3 middle, 4 high, (8 hard-to-staff)
  - Interviews with:
    - 10 principals (up to 4 times in the 2009-10, and once in SY 2008-09)
    - 40 teachers (2 times in the year)
    - 4 PAR coaches working in the schools
    - 6 Master Teachers working in the schools
  - Sampling procedures:
    - In order to compare similar schools that received different resources as a result of QTEA, schools were chosen by pairing hard-to-staff schools with those not labeled hard-to-staff whilst having a similar student demographic and teacher turnover pattern. Schools were selected to represent the city both demographically and geographically.
    - Within the schools, we chose a stratified sample of teachers (4 per school), to represent both new and experienced teachers and those who did and did not receive a bonus.

\*Note: the original case study included 11 schools, but one was dropped from further analysis because events in the school made it incomparable to other schools in the district.

# Overall emerging themes

- In a very challenging policy climate, QTEA implementation is off to a good start.
- Despite areas of improvement, indicators are moving in the right direction:
  - Awareness
  - Buy-in and satisfaction
  - Responsiveness
- The salary and bonus elements of QTEA are the easiest to implement (and their effect is most visible).
- Policies designed to improve teaching and teacher quality are the most challenging, but have high potential.


# **The Quality Teacher and Education Act: First Year Report**

## *Compensation*

## Primary Study Considerations

- District-level policy implementation
  - How were salary and bonus changes rolled out at the district level?
  - How were the subjects and schools chosen for targeted bonuses?
  - How many teachers received targeted bonuses?
- QTEA in schools
  - Retention: How aware of compensation changes were teachers and principals? What were their sources of information?
  - Recruitment: How aware of compensation changes were applicants and first-year teachers? What were their sources of information?
  - Voluntary Transfer: How aware were teachers in non-HTS schools of the incentives available in HTS schools (and which schools were HTS)?
- Effect on outcomes
  - Retention: Did compensation affect teachers' career decisions?
  - Recruitment: Did compensation affect applicants' and new teachers' decisions to teach in SFUSD or in particular schools?
  - Voluntary Transfer: Did QTEA encourage movement to HTS schools?
- Lessons from first year implementation

## Section Overview





# **Compensation: District-level Policy Implementation**

## Overall teacher salary changes were substantial and went into effect immediately

- For teachers with 1 and 10 years of service, respectively, 2009-10 increases were \$5,798 and \$2,028 (compared to 2007-08)
  - This represents an increase of 13% and 3%, respectively.
- The table below shows how salaries compared to neighboring districts before and after QTEA.

District Name	2007-08		2009-10		% Change	
	Step 1	Step 10	Step 1	Step 10	Step 1	Step 10
San Francisco Unified	\$46,202	\$63,272	\$52,000	\$65,300	13%	3%
Oakland Unified	\$40,733	\$54,328	\$40,733	\$54,328	0%	0%
San Jose Unified	\$48,847	\$71,772	\$48,847	\$71,772	0%	0%
Palo Alto Unified	\$53,683	\$79,863	\$55,025	\$81,860	2%	3%

Source: District Salary Schedules for 2007-08 and 2009-10.

Note: Salary information at both Step 1 and Step 10 is for teachers with a BA plus 60 units of continuing education.

# Some compensation bonuses required additional program design

- **Hard-to-staff schools**
  - Schools are re-designated every year.
    - In 2009-10, 25 schools were chosen: 3 alternate grade span schools, 10 elementary schools, 6 middle schools, and 6 high schools.
    - Schools were selected based on data analysis and communication between district leaders and included variables such as teacher turnover, student demographics, and student performance.
  - There was a lack of agreement on the selection of hard-to-staff schools.
    - Some stakeholders would have “liked something that was a little bit more data-driven.”
    - Some schools that weren’t widely considered “hard-to-staff” were chosen for the incentive (for example, Francisco Middle School).
    - Some schools considered “hard-to-staff” were not selected for the bonus (for example, Visitation Valley Middle School).
- **Hard-to-fill subjects**
  - Subjects are re-designated every year, but teachers receive the bonuses for 3 years.
    - In 2009-10, chosen subjects were Math, Science, Bilingual Education and Special Education.
    - While the chosen subjects were widely perceived to be hard-to-fill, principals in some schools had problems in additional areas (i.e., foreign language).

*I. Compensation: District-level policy implementation*

# Bonus payout amounts and schedules since QTEA's passage

	<b>Bonus amount</b>	<b>Payout: 2008-09</b>	<b>Payout: 2009-10</b>
<b>Hard-to-fill</b>	\$1,000	After Spring 2009	After Spring 2010
<b>Hard-to-staff</b>	\$2,000	-	After Fall 2009 & Spring 2010 (half each time)
<b>4<sup>th</sup> year retention</b>	\$2,500	After Spring 2009	After Spring 2010
<b>8<sup>th</sup> year retention</b>	\$3,000	After Spring 2009	After Spring 2010

## Rollout of compensation bonuses was somewhat rocky

- Data and management systems were not set up to handle changes in payroll processing for targeted bonuses:
  - IT, HR, and Payroll departments were not well aligned for collaboration.
  - Data systems were not in place for 100% accurate reporting.
  - Increased attention on salary revealed some long-standing problems in data systems.
- There were insufficient staff/resources for implementation:
  - QTEA reforms were introduced at a time when HR and IT had increased responsibility and reduced staff.
  - There was no additional money for staff time, or the increase in materials like paper, ink, and stamps.
- Initially, about 200 teachers who should have gotten bonuses did not, and several who should not have gotten bonuses did:
  - These cases were uncovered through teacher inquiry and manual checking, which was time-consuming for staff across departments.

*I. Compensation: District-level policy implementation*

## 2009-10 bonuses offered

	<b>Number of recipients</b>	<b>Average amount received*</b>
<b>Hard-to-fill</b>	1453	\$967
<b>Hard-to-staff</b>	1006	\$1861
<b>4<sup>th</sup> year retention</b>	159	\$2494
<b>8<sup>th</sup> year retention</b>	91	\$3000

Source: Analysis of SFUSD Administrative Data 2009-10.

\*Note: Payments were adjusted for FTE.

## There was a strong effort to get the word out about QTEA salary and bonuses

- Communications from United Educators of San Francisco (UESF):
  - Information on the website for current and prospective teachers.
  - Notifications in e-mail “blasts.”
  - Interfacing with specific teachers about concerns.
- Communications from the SFUSD central office:
  - Information on the website for current and prospective teachers.
  - Letters to teachers receiving bonuses (co-signed with UESF).
  - Notifications in the Weekly Administrative Directive (WAD).
  - Notifications over district e-mail.
  - Line item callouts on paychecks indicating QTEA salary and bonus.
- Potential barriers to information receipt:
  - There were some delays in advertising because of delayed decisions at the central office.
  - Teachers are not well connected through district e-mail.

“When the district puts out material, a lot of times we don’t get it...Because we’re not on the distribution list.” (Case study)

# **Compensation → Retention QTEA in Schools**




## Awareness:

### *Teachers became aware between fall and spring*

Awareness about targeted bonuses grew over the course of the year.


- In the fall, relatively few teachers knew about bonuses that they were *going to receive*:
  - Only 56% of eligible teachers were aware of the hard-to-staff school bonus.
  - Only 65% of eligible teachers were aware of the hard-to-fill subject bonus.
- By Spring, teachers were more aware:



## Awareness:

### *Overall compensation elements of QTEA*


By spring, most teachers and principals reported being familiar with compensation changes introduced as a result of QTEA.



74% of principals and 52% of teachers reported being “familiar” with QTEA’s compensation elements. An additional 21% and 41%, respectively, reported that they were “somewhat familiar.”

## Awareness: *Targeted bonuses*

Despite high levels of *reported* awareness, not all teachers were aware of bonuses *they received*, and awareness among principals was lower.




Source:  
2010 Stanford Teacher Survey  
2010 Stanford Principal Survey  
Analysis of SFUSD Administrative Data 2009-10  
Note: Only includes teachers who received bonuses and principals with teachers in the school who received bonuses.

Awareness of HTS school bonus was the highest for both principals and teachers. Teachers were less aware of HTF subject and retention bonuses, and awareness among principals whose teachers received these bonuses was much lower.

## Awareness:

### *Targeted bonuses – hard-to-fill*

Across subject areas, teacher awareness of the hard-to-fill subject bonuses was higher than that of principals.



Source:

2010 Stanford Teacher Survey

2010 Stanford Principal Survey

Analysis of SFUSD Administrative Data 2009-10


Note: Only includes teachers and principals with teachers in the school who received bonuses.

For both principals and teachers, awareness was lowest in bilingual education and Special Education. Incidentally, these subjects are most commonly taught in elementary schools.

## Awareness:

### *Targeted bonuses – hard-to-fill*

Not surprisingly, teacher awareness of hard-to-fill subject bonuses *that they received* was related to their principals' awareness.




85% of teachers in schools where principals were aware of the hard-to-fill bonus were themselves aware, versus only 76% of teachers in schools where principals were not aware.

Source:  
2010 Stanford Teacher Survey (N=590)  
2010 Stanford Principal Survey (N=79)  
Analysis of SFUSD Administrative Data 2009-10  
Chi-square = 5.57, p = 0.02  
Note: Only includes teachers who received bonuses and principals with teachers in the school who received bonuses.

## Awareness:

### *Targeted bonuses – retention bonus*

Again with the retention bonus, teacher awareness was related to their principals' awareness.




87% of teachers in schools where principals were aware of the retention bonus were themselves aware, versus only 62% of teachers in schools where principals were not aware.

Source:  
2010 Stanford Teacher Survey (N=97)  
2010 Stanford Principal Survey (N=44)  
Analysis of SFUSD Administrative Data 2009-10  
Chi-square = 6.28, p = 0.01  
Note: Only includes teachers who received bonuses and principals with teachers in the school who received bonuses.

## Awareness: *Amounts of bonuses received*

Awareness of the bonus amount is high. However, many teachers do not know the size of the bonus or think it is smaller than it actually is.




17% of teachers who got a bonus reported that they did not know the amount. 53% are within \$1,000 of the actual amount, 22% think they got \$1,000+ *less* than actual, and 10% think they got \$1,000+ *more*.

“To be perfectly honest, I haven’t broken down my paycheck or my salary to know which part of it is coming from where.” (Teacher, Case study)

# Awareness:

## *How teachers knew about compensation changes*

Teachers heard about QTEA primarily through UESF, other teachers, and the administration.



“People talk about [the bonuses] a lot. Everyone knows about it.” (Teacher, Case study)

“How did I find it out? Well, I voted for it, for one thing...It was posted on the union website who should get [bonuses] and how much it should be and when you were supposed to get it.” (Teacher, case study)

“We received a letter from the district saying that this is what was going on but also [UESF] notif[jied] us...” (Teacher, case study)


“Oh, we were really involved in Proposition A...We advertised for it. We did phone banking and...we really got our community to vote for Proposition A... So, you know, we wanted it to pass.” (Teacher, case study)



# **Compensation → Retention: Effect on Outcomes**

## Competitiveness of SFUSD salaries

Despite familiarity with salary changes, most teachers did not think salaries were more competitive in 2009-10 compared to the past.



Even among teachers who reported being familiar with QTEA, only 31% reported that salaries in SFUSD were more competitive in 2009-10 than in the past. A similar percentage (32%) reported that salaries were less competitive. In addition, many teachers “don’t know.”

## Case study: Reasons why teachers did not think salaries were more competitive

### ■ Don't know:

- Teachers were satisfied in their role or position, so they were unaware of the competitiveness of salaries.

"I haven't been shopping around because I'm happy staying here, [it's] most convenient."  
(Teacher, case study)

### ■ Less competitive:

- Teachers perceived that SFUSD salaries were still lower than other local districts, despite the fact that they were in fact more competitive than before.

"I ask myself all the time why I'm still here... teachers definitely get paid a lot more [in the South Bay]." (Teacher, case study)


### ■ As competitive:

- Teachers may have been aware of QTEA's compensation changes but did not think they were substantial.
- Even with the increased salary in SFUSD, teachers do not think salaries compete with those in higher-paying Peninsula districts.

"...Prop A stuff is good compensation. I make more money than I've ever made. [But] compared to other school districts, it's fine. It's normal." (Teacher, case study)

## Effect of QTEA on teachers' reported decision to remain teaching in the 2009-10 school year

While the majority of teachers said that QTEA did not affect their decisions to stay in their school, many receiving large bonus amounts reported that salary and bonus was “important” or “very important.”




Teachers who received larger bonuses were more likely to report that salary and bonus was important in their decision to stay at their school. 33% of those receiving \$2,500 or more reported that salary and bonus was “important” or “very important”, compared to only 22% for those who received no bonus.

Source:  
2010 Stanford Teacher Survey (N=1302)  
Analysis of SFUSD Administrative Data 2009-10  
Chi-square = 28.31, p = 0.00  
Note: Excludes first year teachers in the school.

## Possible effect of QTEA on teachers' long-term career plans

Compared to 2008, more teachers reported that they planned to stay in SFUSD for 10+ years or until retirement.




Source:  
2008 TNTP Teacher Survey (N=879)  
2010 Stanford Teacher Survey (N=1484)  
Chi-square = 30.60, p = 0.00

In 2008, 43% of teachers reported that they would stay 10 years or more or until retirement; in 2010, this number had increased to 50%. It must be noted that this result could be due to the economic downturn or other factors instead of (or in addition to) QTEA. This will be investigated in further years of the study.

# Possible effect of QTEA on teachers' reasons for leaving


Of teachers planning to leave in 5 years or fewer, salary was less of a reason in 2010 than in 2008.



In 2008 and 2010, teachers planning to leave in five or fewer years were asked why. While “cost of living” and “pay & incentives” remain among the highest responses, fewer teachers in 2010 reported those reasons compared to 2008 (57% vs. 47% and 53% vs. 42%, respectively).

## Principals' reports of the effect of QTEA on teacher retention

While the majority of principals reported that QTEA had no effect on teacher retention, those in HTS schools reported that it helped.



Source:  
2010 Stanford Principal Survey (N=86)  
Analysis of SFUSD Administrative Data 2009-10  
Chi-square = 7.28, p = 0.12

Principals in HTS schools were more likely to report that salary and bonus had a positive effect on teacher retention. 48% of those in HTS schools reported that QTEA “helped a little” or “helped a lot”, compared to only 18% of others.


# **Compensation → Recruitment QTEA in Schools**



## First-year teachers: Awareness

*Limited familiarity with QTEA compared to others*

Overall, far fewer first-year teachers reported familiarity with QTEA compared to teachers with more experience.




Only 24% of first-year teachers reported familiarity with QTEA compared to 56% of teachers with more experience.

“[QTEA] affects my coworkers’ salaries and I would imagine it may affect mine but I haven’t really done any research on it. I’m still new enough I’m busy trying to get my own little world in order...” (First-year teacher, Case study)

## First-year teachers: Awareness

*Less awareness of targeted bonuses than others*

Fewer first-year teachers reported being aware of targeted bonuses *they received* compared to teachers with more experience.




Source:  
2010 Stanford Teacher Survey  
Analysis of SFUSD Administrative Data 2009-10  
\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$   
Note: Only includes teachers who received bonuses.

First-year teachers had as much awareness as others of hard-to-staff school bonuses. However, only 51% of first-year teachers were aware of the hard-to-fill subject bonuses *they received*, compared to 81% of those with more experience.

# First-year teachers: Awareness

## *How they heard about salary & bonus changes*

First-year teachers and more experienced teachers learned about QTEA through different channels.




First-year teachers were most likely to have learned about QTEA through other teachers in their school (46%), whereas more experienced teachers were most likely to have learned about QTEA from UESF (64%).

## Applicants: Awareness

### *Limited familiarity with QTEA*

Overall, applicants had very limited awareness of QTEA as a policy that increased teacher compensation.




Only 5% of applicants (both those who applied before and after QTEA) reported being familiar with QTEA. More teachers reported that they were somewhat familiar, but the majority in both groups reported no familiarity. Note that applicants may not have been aware of QTEA but could be aware of its provisions.

# Applicants: Awareness

## *Hard-to-fill subject bonus*

Applicants were moderately aware of hard-to-fill subject bonuses they *would have* received.




44% of applicants in hard-to-fill subjects were aware of this bonus, but awareness varied by subject: 43% of math teachers, 45% of science teachers, 31% of bilingual teachers, and 50% of Special Education teachers were aware.

## Applicants: Awareness

### *How they heard about salary & bonus changes*

Applicants learned about QTEA primarily through the local media and by living in San Francisco.




39% of applicants reported that they learned about QTEA through the media, compared to 33% who learned from living in SF, and 30% who knew other teachers in SFUSD. Fewer (4%) learned about QTEA through their credential program.

# **Compensation → Recruitment Effect on Outcomes**

## First year teachers:

*Salary & bonus affected teachers' decision to come to SF*

First-year teachers reported that salary and benefits were more of a reason in 2010 (than in 2008) for choosing to work in SFUSD.




While “geographic location” remains the most frequently reported reason, 26% of first-year teachers reported that salary and benefits were the reasons for choosing to work in SFUSD, compared to only 8% in 2008. Again, it must be noted that this result could be due to economic downturn or other factors instead of (or in addition) to QTEA.



# Applicants: *Competitiveness of SFUSD salaries*

Despite their limited awareness of QTEA as a policy, applicants who applied post-QTEA reported that salaries were more competitive.




21% of applicants who applied before QTEA reported that salaries were less competitive than other districts, compared to 6% of post-QTEA applicants. Most importantly, only 16% of pre-QTEA applicants reported that salaries were more competitive, compared to 28% post-QTEA.

## Applicants:

*Some applicants report that salary was important*

Some applicants in hard-to-fill subjects reported that salary and bonus were important in their decision to choose to apply to SFUSD.




Of applicants in hard-to-fill subjects who were aware of the bonus, 29% reported that the additional incentive was “important” or “very important” in their decision to apply to work in SFUSD.

## Principal reports:

### *Salary & bonus helped recruitment in HTS schools*

While the majority of principals reported that QTEA had no effect on teacher recruitment, those in HTS schools reported that it helped.




While the majority of principals in non-HTS schools reported no effect (54%), 54% of principals in HTS schools reported that QTEA salary and bonus helped in recruiting teachers.

“...I could easily hypothesize that if I was having a really hard time, to explain to somebody that a couple of extra checks a year would also be part of this process, it certainly could only help.” (Principal, Case study)

## Principal reports:

*There are more available new hires in “high-need areas”*

In addition, principals in 2010 reported that there were more new hires in “high need areas” than in 2008.




In both years, principals were asked if there were enough new-hires in high-need areas. In 2010, 42% of principals said yes, compared to only 28% in 2008. However, many principals contributed this to the economic downturn.

“I used to [have a hard time recruiting bilingual teachers] but last year because of the economy, and it’s going to be the same this year, there are a lot of candidates out there.” (Principal, Case study)

## Principal reports:

### *Principals' satisfaction with external hires has increased*

Most importantly, more principals in 2010 reported that they were satisfied with *the quality* of new hires than in 2008.




In 2008, 69% of principals reported that they were “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the quality of external applicants, compared to 81% in 2010. However, many principals contributed this to the economy or to positive changes in Human Resources.

“This year...there’s just a lot of stronger teachers coming in to interview, I feel.” (Principal, Case study)

# **Compensation → Voluntary Transfer QTEA in Schools**

## Awareness of teachers in non-HTS schools who could potentially transfer

Teachers who were not already in hard-to-staff schools had relatively high awareness of which schools are hard-to-staff.



Source:  
2010 Stanford Teacher Survey (N=911)  
Analysis of SFUSD Administrative Data 2009-10  
Chi-square = 20.58, p = 0.00

Overall, 22% of teachers could not name any HTS schools. Of the others, teachers in middle school were most familiar (85% could name one or more HTS school) and those in high school were least aware (73% could name one or more).

“I’d have to see the list of what the hard-to-staff schools are. I don’t know off the top of my head what all of them are.” (Teacher, Case study)

# **Compensation → Voluntary Transfer Effect on Outcomes**



## Effect of QTEA on transfer:

### *Observed movement between schools*

Despite this high awareness, transfer to hard-to-staff schools post-QTEA (28%) was not significantly different from the average of the previous 5 years (19%).<sup>1</sup>

	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08 <sup>3</sup>	2008-09	2009-10
Number of teachers who transferred (through means other than consolidation)	117	84	56	N/A	72	47
Transfers to HTS schools <sup>1</sup>	23%	25%	20%	N/A	10%	28%


While it looks like the percentage of teachers moving into HTS schools is up in 2009-10, it must be noted that this result is not strongly significant<sup>2</sup> and that this pattern could be due to the economic downturn or to other factors instead of (or in addition) to QTEA.

1. Test for significance before and after QTEA: Chi-square = 2.18 , p = 0.14
2. Test for significance of differences across years: Chi-square = 7.95, p = 0.09
3. Our data files for 2008 are incomplete at this time.

Source: Analysis of SFUSD Administrative Data 2004-10.

## Effect of QTEA on transfer: *Teacher reports*

Of teachers who transferred in 2009-10 or 2010-11, none reported that salary and bonus was a consideration in their move.




Of teachers who transferred post-QTEA, most report “the opportunity for a different assignment” (20%) and “the principal” (20%) as their top criteria when selecting a new school. Case study reports indicate that teachers look for “fit.”

“My main concern is the environment because teaching is stressful, even when I’m confident in the classroom”. (Teacher, case study)

## Effect of QTEA on *potential* transfer: *Teachers don't want to transfer to HTS schools*

Of teachers who had not applied for a transfer, 17% reported that they would, and an additional 38% reported that they might.

Teacher Willingness to Transfer to a Hard-to-Staff School, by Whether They Would Transfer in General




Source:  
2010 Stanford Teacher Survey (N=507)  
Analysis of SFUSD Administrative Data 2009-10  
Chi-square = 8.08, p = 0.02  
Note: Only includes teachers in non-HTS schools who would consider transferring in general.

However, even of those teachers who would or might transfer, 41% and 44%, respectively, would not consider a transfer to a hard-to-staff school. However, 36% and 25%, respectively, *would* consider a transfer to a hard-to-staff school.

## Effect of QTEA on *potential* transfer:

### *Why teachers do not want to transfer to HTS schools*

There are varied reasons why teachers who would transfer in general would not transfer to a hard-to-staff school.



Source:

2010 Stanford Teacher Survey (N=221)

Analysis of SFUSD Administrative Data 2009-10

Note: Only includes teachers who would transfer in general but not to a HTS school.

Many teachers reported that they are happy (67%) or that they don't want to change schools (53%). However, 52% reported that the bonus amount is not enough, and 22% would not move to a HTS school because they do not think the bonus will persist.

## Effect of QTEA on *potential* transfer: *Elaboration on why teachers would not transfer*

In the case study, teachers elaborated on their thoughts about transferring to a hard-to-staff school:

- In a hard-to-staff school, leadership and supportive colleagues are especially important.
- Teachers have a perspective that the culture in some hard-to-staff schools is not supportive, or even “combative.”
- Teachers believe there is a professional disposition that provides motivation for working in a hard-to-staff school, and a bonus does not affect this.
- The bonus size is too small to encourage movement.

“I would have no problem with the demographics of a hard-to-staff school... What would be more [influential] on my decision is if I could get a sense of what’s going on in the faculty. Like, what are they trying to do with this hard-to-staff school?” (Teacher, case study)

“[At hard-to-staff schools], it seems like teachers there, instead of supporting each other, kind of fight each other and I need teachers that are actually support[ive] and helpful around me, instead of combative.” (Teacher case study)

“[Moving to a hard-to-staff school for bonus] is counterintuitive. It’s not like the bonus is that much of a bonus. And if you’re the type of person that is willing to work at a hard-to-staff school, I don’t think a bonus of that size has any bearing on your decision.” (Teacher, case study)

“...Would I change jobs and come to [a hard-to-staff school] because I knew I was going to be getting another \$1,000 a year? No.” (Teacher, Case Study)

# **Compensation: Lessons from First Year Implementation**

## Conclusions

- Principals, teachers, and applicants seem generally aware of compensation changes as a result of QTEA.
  - Hard-to-staff school bonus has highest awareness, while teachers are less aware of hard-to-fill subject and retention bonuses.
- Principals, teachers, and applicants are happy that QTEA has provided increased salary and targeted bonuses.
- After the first year of implementation, indicators are moving in the right direction:
  - Principal, teacher, and applicant reports indicate the potential for longer-term effect on recruitment and retention.
  - Voluntary transfer does not seem as affected by QTEA's compensation elements.
- However, principals and teachers are doubtful about how large an effect compensation can have on teacher recruitment and retention, especially given the program postponement.

## Factors that may mediate QTEA's effect:

### *Teacher factors*

- Teachers report that they do not make career decisions based on compensation but rather on non-pecuniary elements.
- For this reason, the effect of QTEA may be marginal.
- The amounts of salary and bonus may not be high enough to affect teachers' behavior.

"The reason why I became a teacher was because this is what I wanted to do, and not to make money...I didn't come into teaching thinking, oh, in the future I hopefully will get paid more." (Teacher, case study)

"I think [salary and bonus increases] are nice and I think maybe a teacher might put up with more temporarily." (Principal, case study)

"I mean, [in] changing jobs, there [are] so many variables involved. I would consider the loss of money, but it's not a huge compensation when you weigh that against overall job satisfaction." (Teacher, case study)

"It's not about the money, it's about the work, and it's about the commitment...the difference in salary is not significant enough." (Principal, case study)



## Factors that may mediate QTEA's effect: *Structural factors related to human capital*

- Recruitment, retention and voluntary transfer are not concerns in the context of layoffs.
- Even in hard-to-staff schools, the extent to which recruitment and retention is a problem varies:
  - 67% of principals in HTS schools report that teacher retention is a challenge, compared to 8% in non-HTS schools.
  - 76% of principals in HTS schools report teacher recruitment is a challenge, compared to 50% in non-HTS schools.
- Many principals report that they have limited control over staffing, which limits their ability to strategically recruit or retain high-quality teachers.

"I think incentives for high-needs areas are good. We are a hard-to-staff school so the teachers do get a \$2,000 bonus actually. But that doesn't matter when it comes to a layoff – a hard-to-staff school is a designation that doesn't matter. ...If hard-to-staff schools were also identified as schools out of the seniority...that would be ideal." (Principal, case study)

"We don't have trouble recruiting. We don't have trouble holding onto our teachers. We're very stable, very solid, which contradicts the usual urban education high school model." (Principal in a HTS school, case study)

Only 10% of principals "agree" or "strongly agree" that they are able to hire the best instructional team for their school.

(Principal survey)

## Factors that may mediate QTEA's effect:

### *Structural factors related to long-term implementation*

- There may be a stronger effect once QTEA has been implemented longer.
  - These kind of interventions often take years to show meaningful effect on outcomes.
- Salary and bonus changes may be trumped by the downturn in the economy.
- As the district works to improve human capital policy district-wide, changes become increasingly difficult to attribute to QTEA.

"I don't think [there has been an effect on retention] yet because it hasn't really stuck into people's heads." (Principal, case study)

"The only thing that I would think would play a role [in teacher retention] is the economy – that's why [teachers] wouldn't want to leave, and they don't want to lose their seniority." (Principal, case study)

"I used to [have a hard time recruiting bilingual teachers] but last year because of the economy - and it's going to be the same this year - there are a lot of candidates out there." (Principal, case study)

"The main reason [for improvements in recruitment] is the economy, to be truthful. Across the board, the level of candidates out there is phenomenal." (Principal, case study)

"This year...the support from HR is totally different. I think they have this thing called the "New Teacher Project". It's through HR and they support hard-to-fill schools." (Principal, case study)

## Lessons to improve policy implementation:

### *Clearer process and communication*

- There was limited money set aside to support additional administrative work:
  - QTEA did not provide for additional program administrator(s), staff hours, or materials.
  - In QTEA's development, the time and resources required for implementation may have been underestimated.
- A lack of communication made implementation difficult:
  - Between departments who are responsible for implementing payroll changes.
  - Between the central office and teachers/principals.
  - Between stakeholders invested in policy implementation.
- Communication of goals, processes and procedures could improve implementation moving forward:
  - Set clear timelines and expectations in advance.
  - Streamline data alignment so that different systems can be merged more cleanly.
  - Barriers to the effect of QTEA on teacher recruitment, retention, and transfer could be addressed head-on.
  - A clear theory of action on how policy elements are expected to help teacher recruitment, retention, and voluntary transfer could help policy refinement.

# **The Quality Teacher and Education Act: First Year Report**

## ***Prop A Professional Development Hours***

## Primary Study Considerations

- District-level policy implementation
  - How were the professional development hours implemented at the district level in the 2009-2010 school year?
  - Did district stakeholders believe that the rollout of the professional development hours served QTEA's intended goals?
- QTEA in schools
  - Were principals and teachers aware of the additional professional development hours?
  - How many teachers used the hours?
    - If teachers did not use all of the hours, why not?
  - How did schools and teachers use the additional professional development hours?
- Effect on outcomes
  - Were the Prop A professional development hours aligned with teachers' and school goals? Were they useful?
  - Were teachers using the hours spending more time engaging in activities supported by the implementation of the hours?
- Lessons from first year implementation

**Prop A PD Hours:  
District-level Policy Implementation**

## Prop A Professional Development design

- The original policy offered teachers 18 additional hours of professional development.
- The goal of hours was to provide high-quality PD that was both job embedded and differentiated.
- To this end, as it was implemented, the 18 hours were broken up into three suggested six-hour categories:
  - Equity-Centered Professional Learning Communities (ECPLC)
    - Used at the teacher's discretion.
  - Supporting site's Balanced Scorecard implementation (BSC)
    - Used at the principal's discretion.
  - District initiatives supported by APD and Student Support Services (APD/SSS)
    - Used at the teacher's discretion, but only on district-level professional development.

## Prop A PD Procedure

- The hours were voluntary for teachers to pursue.
- The three categories were designed to be flexible, not rigid requirements.
- The process for logging the hours was as follows:
  1. Approved activities were determined by the teacher, school or district, depending on the category.
  2. The teacher attended an approved professional development activity and got a signature from the PD provider.
  3. The teacher turned in a copy of the “passport” to the principal for approval.
    - The “passport” is the district document teachers use to report the number of Prop A hours used for each of the three categories.
  4. The district logs in the hours completed by the teacher and compensates the teacher within the next pay period.



## Concerns with district-level implementation

- Overall, district stakeholders were positive about the program and believed it could be positive for school improvement.
- However, during the design process, there were some concerns:
  - As to how the extra hours could simultaneously meet teacher, school and district goals.
  - About how to ensure the quality of professional development.
  - Regarding the level of oversight that is needed and/or appropriate.
- In response to these concerns (and lessons about school-site implementation), program staff made mid-year corrections:
  - Awareness campaign with principals and teachers.
  - Site visits with schools to advise on the use of the hours.

# **Prop A PD Hours: QTEA in Schools**

## Confusion about process: *Category definitions*

- The three categories of PD hours were designed to provide guidance, and not to be restrictive categories.
- However, many principals and teachers were not familiar with the categories or their use.
- Of those principals and teachers who were aware of the categories, some found them to be unclear and overly restrictive.
- However, some principals and teachers found the hours to be similar and indistinguishable, and used them flexibly.

“[The system for logging the Prop A PD hours is] just really confusing... There [are] three separate categories, and what you do has to fall under one of the categories, and they’re not explained, really. So, almost all of the teachers were kind of like: ‘Well, we do all of this stuff. We work really hard. We work after school every day. We work on the weekends.’ We do all this great stuff. But it doesn’t seem to fit in this three-category form that we have to fill out.” (Teacher, Case Study)

“We’ve focused most of our work here at the school site on equity-centered professional learning community and balanced scorecard. You know, they kind of go hand-in-hand, it’s kind of hard to separate them.” (Principal, Case study)

“So, with Prop A, you can use it to address your balanced scorecard, to address like professional learning...[a]nd they all interchange.” (Principal, Case study)

## Confusion about process:

### *How hours were determined and billed*

- Many principals and teachers were unsure about who could determine the use of the hours:
  - The majority of principals assumed the ECPLC and the BSC to be under the administrator's discretion and the APD/SSS to be under the teacher's discretion.
  - The majority of teachers attended self-initiated and school-initiated events, without a clear idea of how the hours were ultimately billed.
- Principals reported a low-usage of teacher-initiated professional development hours, but teachers report using most of the extra hours.
  - This could be due to principals' reported low knowledge as to how teachers were using their hours or teachers being unaware of how many hours they have discretion over.
- Some principals reported taking control of all of the available hours to ease the reporting burden for both themselves and teachers.


"I try to make [the Prop A PD] school-wide because...we were given passports to give out to teachers, and I thought...that's a nightmare. I have 25 classroom teachers and then another 5 out of the classroom as literacy specialists, an IRF, etc. I can't manage all of that stuff." (Principal, Case study)

## II. Prop A PD Hours: QTEA in schools

Due to confusion, there was variation in use of hours, particularly by school level

On the survey, 100% of principals and 87% of teachers reported that the Prop A PD hours were available to them, but not all used them.

Number of Prop A PD Hours Teachers Used in 2009-10,  
By School Level




Teachers in elementary school were most likely to use most of the hours (51%) compared to only 30% and 33% in middle school and high school (respectively).

Source:  
2010 Stanford Teacher Survey (N=1454)  
Analysis of SFUSD Administrative Data 2009-10  
Chi-square = 94.08, p = 0.00  
Note: Teachers who were not aware of the hours are counted as using none.

## II. Prop A PD Hours: QTEA in schools

# Actual and reported use of the hours is very similar, indicating teacher awareness

When actual payments are compared to teachers' reported use of the hours, numbers are similar, but teachers slightly underestimate.




Source:  
Analysis of SFUSD Administrative Data 2009-10 (N = 3116)  
2010 Stanford Teacher Survey (N = 1520)  
Chi-square = 19.76, p = 0.00  
Note: Only includes those sampled for the 2010 Stanford Teacher Survey.

40% of teachers reported that they used 13-18 of the hours, while 44% of teachers actually received payment for these hours. The difference could be accounted for by teachers lack of awareness that the hours are “Prop A Hours,” or another person could be logging the hours for them.

# Teachers not using all hours report varied reasons

The majority of teachers reported that they did not use the additional PD hours is because they did not have time.



In addition, 30% of teachers reported that they did not like the options for use, 11% said the amount of money was not enough, and a combined 12% reported that they did have enough PD or did not need additional PD.

## Reasons for low usage of PD hours:

### *“I don’t have time”*

- Principals preferred offering PD on evenings, weekends and summer break.
  - Principals hesitated to allow teachers to use release days for PD because of the effect on their students’ performance.
  - Many principals used the hours to extend existing staff meetings.
  - Principals reported that summer and weekend workshops were better attended.
- However, many teachers didn’t have the time or interest to work outside of school hours.

“[I]t means teachers are out of the classroom...all of it means there’s a sub who does not know the kids or instruction or what’s going on, you know, so the kids lose out...For kids like ours, they’re [less] resilient when the adults are not consistent or present for them.” (Principal, Case study)

“Next Wednesday, we always have the P.E. teacher from 12:45 to 1:45. We’re still in school on contract, but we’re going to have an extended Teacher Collaborative Meeting...But that last hour of the day, we don’t need to be there, so money from Prop A is going to pay us for that extra hour.” (Teacher, Case study)

“...I can get people to do [summer and weekend workshops] more so than I can get people to go after school...They’re just burnt out.” (Principal, Case study)

“[The Prop A PD opportunities are] on Saturdays, and my wife works on the weekend, so I have my kids on the weekends...[so it’s] a domestic concern and I have to give priority to the family.” (Teacher, Case study)



## Reported low usage of Prop A PD hours:

*“I don’t like the options for use”*

- Some teachers weren’t happy with the timing or specific offerings of district-level PD.

“A lot of the PDs that the district has to offer don’t usually happen during the day, so we can’t use them anyway...Unless something really was interesting, I probably wouldn’t go out of my way to do it.” (Teacher, Case study)

- Principals and teachers did not fully understand the options for use and the procedures for submitting the hours.

“I have all these things I could apply to [because] I always work after school. But I’m not sure what they take.” (Teacher, Case Study)

“I think it’s a matter of time, a matter of organization...there are people out there that have done things and just haven’t written it down...I just think they’re not paying attention.” (Principal, Case study)

“There hasn’t been a lot of discussions from the central office with the principals to say, these are exactly the things that teachers can do.” (Principal, Case study)

“[The central office] did communicate it to us. There was one pager...it was just kind of like no follow up...plus, we had all of this other PD stuff so how does that overlap?” (Principal, Case study)

## Reasons for low usage of PD hours:

### *“I have enough PD opportunities”*

- Schools with other sources of professional development funding (e.g., DREAM schools) used Prop A PD hours but found the other sources easier to use because of they were not as restrictive.
- Teachers had existing financial coverage to pursue their PD activities.

“Prop A parameters are more clearly defined than [for] DREAM schools...there are a lot of strings that are attached and it’s not as easy to access as the DREAM school funds...it’s a lot of documentation, to be honest with you. And then there are three categories for Prop A...[s]o the activity has to be clearly defined within one of those three categories.” (Principal, Case Study)

“[A]nother reason why we didn’t use [the Prop A PD hours] perhaps as much as many other schools is because we have that early release day, and so much of our professional development was done during that time. And so, teachers really didn’t need to use the hours.” (Principal, Case study)

“I used 10 because it has to be after school, stuff that’s not paid. So, most of the after-school stuff is paid, so this is in addition to that.” (Teacher, Case study)

## Hours were used primarily for school-level PD and common planning

- School-level professional development (37%)
  - Teachers participated in extended faculty meetings, literacy nights and open houses for students and parents, school-wide lesson planning, guest speakers, reviewing school's budget, students' house visits, reflecting on the school's progress for the past academic year, making plans for the next academic year, and preparing for WASC accreditation.
- Common-planning time (21%)
  - Teachers participated in department and grade-level meetings, professional learning communities (PLC), teacher collaborative meetings (TCM), curriculum development, creating a freshman academy, grading assessments and making plans for the next academic year.
- External professional development (18%)
  - Teachers participated in earning national board certifications, programs with the community programs regarding social issues, and conferences within the Bay Area and in other cities in California such as Sacramento and San Diego.
- District-level professional development (11%)
  - Teachers participated in conferences and technology training (e.g., using the interactive whiteboards).

# **Prop A PD Hours: Effect on Outcomes**

## Prop A PD usefulness: *Reports from the case study*

- Principals found the Prop A PD hours to be very useful for staff development.
- Teachers considered the hours as an extra, “nice perk.”
- Both principals and teachers agreed that the program was rewarding already proactive teachers, but both thought it could be a good incentive for encouraging less-motivated teachers to participate in extra professional development.

“The teachers I would expect to do it are doing it, and the teachers that kind of come to work and then leave right when their...hours are up, they don't. So it's not really a surprise at all.”  
(Principal, Case study)

“I think the 18 hours that was given to the teachers and the [paraprofessionals] was a good thing, and many people have taken advantage of it in positive ways to help themselves and empower themselves.”  
(Principal, Case study)

“The Prop A money isn't going to change your life, it's nice to have. But the reason I did those two things as opposed to a lot of the other Prop A stuff that was available was because it was meaningful for this school in particular, it was meaningful for me.” (Teacher, Case Study)

“I was getting paid for the things that I already do that I normally don't get paid for.” (Teacher, Case Study)


“[F]or some teachers, [the hours] will give them the extra push to go, and then you get to do it on what you want, on what you think would be valuable to your program. So, I think that [the hours] are beneficial.” (Teacher, Case Study)

“The only Prop A thing that we did was the Professional Learning Community, and I would not have pursued that unless the funds were available.” (Teacher, Case study)

## II. Prop A PD Hours: Effect on outcomes

# Prop A PD usefulness: *Reports from the survey*

Overall, principals found the hours more useful than teachers, perhaps because of the restrictions on the hours.



Teachers were asked to what extent Prop A PD hours were useful in helping them meet their personal instructional goals, and principals were asked to what extent the hours helped in meeting the school's instructional goals. Overall, principals found the hours more useful than teachers.

Note: The effectiveness of PD has been shown to be related to teachers' perceptions about the coherence of their experiences, and we use "usefulness" as a measure of coherence. See for example Penuel, et. al (2007).

## Prop A PD alignment with school goals:

### *Reports from the case study*

- Principals felt that they could align the Prop A PD hours with their view of school goals, using the hours to support their programs.
- However, teachers were unsure how much control they had over these hours, and so didn't feel that the hours were always aligned with their view of the school's goals.


"Initially, I had to set aside the last grade level release day as a home visit day, and with the six hours, I don't have to do that. I could use them as professional development. So it's helped in that sense." (Principal, Case Study)

"We were having a conversation with our principal about how to use the rest of the hours because we've done a lot of after-school work bringing in students and parents for literacy nights and open house...so we were under the impression that we could use our Prop A hours for that and then she was saying 'No, we can't use it for that.' So, I guess it has to be more like direct professional development. So, I'm not sure how I'm going to use the rest of the hours." (Teacher, Case Study)

## II. Prop A PD Hours: Effect on outcomes

# Prop A PD alignment with school goals: *Reports from the survey*

The majority of principals and teachers found the hours to be aligned with the school's improvement strategy.



While both principals and teachers reported that the hours were aligned, principals reported higher alignment, perhaps because they felt more in control of the use of the hours.

Note: The effectiveness of PD has been shown to be related to teachers' perceptions about the coherence of their experiences, and we use "alignment" as a measure of coherence. See for example Penuel, et. al (2007).



## Effect on teacher collaboration:

### *Reports from the case study*

- Many of the hours were used for offering or extending school-based collaboration activities, which may not have been available to teachers without QTEA.


“I think we’ve had a couple [Teacher Collaborative Meetings], like maybe two through the year, and then we’ll have a data release day where we pretty much have half the day released. We’ll have a sub covered, where we are adults, and a lot of time to collaborate and either rubric papers or plan for next year.”  
(Teacher, Case study)

“[Without Prop A], we wouldn’t be able to collaborate as much, and we wouldn’t be able to discuss. So, I think all of this extra time is really beneficial especially when we’re working in departments because we can get things done together...then we’re all kind of on the same page, and especially for a hard-to-staff school like ours, when we all know what we’re doing, it kind of makes us all at ease and it makes us work together and it makes our school flow a little better.” (Teacher, Case Study)

## II. Prop A PD Hours: Effect on outcomes

# Effect on teacher collaboration: *Reports from the survey*

Teachers who used Prop A PD hours collaborated more frequently.



Teachers were asked how frequently they engaged in various collaborative activities per year. When summing these activities, we see that teachers who used the majority of the hours collaborated more than those who used none. While we cannot show that this effect is causal, it points toward a possible effect of QTEA on teacher collaboration.

Note: For detail on the construction of the collaboration measure, see the Appendix.

**Prop A PD Hours:  
Lessons from First Year Implementation**

## Prop A PD hours program strongly supported, but impact can be improved

- District-wide, principals, teachers, leaders and stakeholders support the hours and think they could have a significant impact on teacher practice and student achievement.
- Research shows that PD is most effective when it\*:
  - Is focused on content knowledge.
  - Provides opportunities for active learning.
  - Is coherent with other learning opportunities.
- Prop A PD is hitting some of these marks:
  - Teachers often use the hours for collaboration.
  - Teachers and principals report high alignment with school goals.
- However, PD is not consistently providing meaningful opportunities:
  - Because of confusion about how to use the hours, principals and teachers did not always report using the hours in the most strategic way.
  - Teachers reported relatively low usefulness in meeting their personal goals.
  - Many teachers used the hours to be paid for things they were already doing.

## In future years, implementation of PD hours may improve potential impact

- While the program was designed to meet multiple goals at once, a more flexible design may allow for principals and teachers to choose PD opportunities more strategically.
- A clearer explanation of this program and its procedures could improve the implementation, specifically:
  - What activities are acceptable for use of the Prop A PD hours.
  - Which actors initiate each of categories of hours (e.g., district program director, school administrator, teacher).
  - The procedure as to how teachers should have their hours approved and receive payment for the hours completed.

# **The Quality Teacher and Education Act: First Year Report**

## ***Master Teacher Program***

## Primary Study Considerations

- District-level policy implementation
  - How was the Master Teacher Program designed after QTEA's passage?
  - In the first year of implementation, did the design of the Master Teacher program serve QTEA's intended goals?
  - How was the Master Teacher Program implemented by program administrators?
- QTEA in schools
  - What were Master Teachers doing in the schools?
  - Were principals and teachers aware of the Master Teachers and their work?
- Effect on outcomes
  - Was the Master Teacher program aligned with teachers' and school goals?  
Was it useful?
- Lessons from first year implementation

# **Master Teacher Program: District-level Policy Implementation**



## Original design reconceptualized

- As passed, QTEA provided for up to 50 teachers, paid a stipend of \$2,500, with 0.2 release time.
- The program as laid out in QTEA's MOU was difficult to implement:
  - 0.2 release time for teachers makes in-school scheduling difficult, especially in elementary school.
  - Principals objected to taking their best teachers out of the classroom.
- As implemented, the program included:
  - Full-time release teachers who travel to different sites supporting first-year teachers (elementary school only).
    - These teachers replaced BTSA support providers in selected schools.
  - 0.2 release teachers who have one period off per week to work with other teachers (middle and high school only).
  - Demonstration teachers who have release time and substitute support to work with other teachers (all levels).
- Although imagined as a broader program, it was designed in the first year to support new teachers.

## Problems with program rollout


- Because of a push to roll out in 2009-10, implementation happened fast and late.
  - The selection committee was not able to observe a teaching lesson or talk to the teacher's colleagues prior to selection.
  - There was not sufficient communication with principals, potential Master Teachers, or other stakeholders.
  - While there were many high quality candidates, overall quality of candidates was perceived as lacking, and there were not enough.
- As a result, some principals resisted having a Master Teacher.
  - Some principals felt the program implementation was “top-down”, and that they did not have a say in which teachers were selected.
  - Some principals were concerned that the full-time Master Teacher (coming from the outside) would not support the school's goals.
  - Some principals felt that there was already enough support for first year teachers, or that they would prefer to build support systems in-house.
- There was some question about the goals of the MT program and whether the program design served these goals.
  - Some stakeholders disagreed with the focus on new teachers, believing that the original intent of the policy was to support more experienced teachers.
  - Revised program design (specifically the full-time Master Teachers) did not provide for leadership opportunities *within a teachers' own school*.

## Because of problems with program rollout, selection of Master Teachers was not ideal

- The program administrators wanted Master Teachers to serve in the hardest-to-staff schools and subjects, but this did not happen:
  - Because teachers applied on their own, teachers from “not hard-to-staff schools” applied, and because of a lack of other applicants, they were selected.
  - As one program administrator said, “We were centralizing instead of strategizing” (Case study).
- In some cases, the selection of the Master Teachers was not strategic.
  - There were sometimes multiple Master Teachers in the same school, due to lack of applicants in other schools.
  - There was limited coordination with the principal to ensure that selected Master Teachers were from high-need grades or subjects.

# Schools with Master Teachers: *How principals perceived selection*

Of the *selected* Master Teachers, most principals reported that the teacher pursued the opportunity with his or her support.



In 85% of cases, Master Teachers pursued the position with the principals' support. However, in 8% of cases, the Master Teacher applied without the principals' support, and in 31% of cases, another administrator (rather than the principal) encouraged the teacher to apply. 100

## Schools without Master Teachers:

### *Reasons why they did not have Master Teachers*

- No teachers applied for the program.

“I tried to get my teachers to be on that but they were just like, no.” (Principal, Case study)

- Concerns about how the Master Teacher would fit into school culture.

“I think it would cause some animosity among the troops if some people were more favored than others.” (Principal, Case study)

- Concerns about who gets selected.

“...Teachers had complete autonomy to apply...so administrators had no authority to say... ‘No, I don’t want you to be my Master Teacher on site because you’re not a very good teacher.’” (Principal, Case study)

“...I’d like to be able to see a clearly-defined way that we select these individuals...” (Principal, Case study)

## Final in-school distribution of Master Teachers

Type of MT*	Hard-to-Staff Schools	Total
No MT	8	79
Full-time MT	11	11
Demonstration MT	2	7
0.2 Release MT	3	6
Demonstration & 0.2 Release MT	1	2
Total	25	105

In 2009-10, Master Teachers provided support to approximately 200 of their colleagues.

- Full time MTs: General, Special Education, Spanish & Chinese Bilingual
- Demonstration MTs: General (42%), Art (8%), Math, Science, and English (17% each)
- 0.2 Release MTs: Art (25%), English (75%)

\*Some schools have more than one Master Teacher

# **Master Teacher Program: QTEA in Schools**

## Master Teachers were often the “best person for the job,” but not always

- 77% of principals reported that the Master Teacher working in their school was the best person for the job but 23% disagree:

“Other teachers do not want to work with the Master Teacher.” (Principal survey)

“This particular Master Teacher...does not have a lot of respect from her colleagues, and so there [were] a lot of questions...: ‘Why is she the Master Teacher?’” (Principal, Case study)

“I would not have recommended this teacher.” (Principal survey)



# The enacted Master Teacher role:

## *Full-time Master Teachers*

- The Full-time Master Teachers' role
  - Full-time Master Teachers replaced BTSA providers in participating schools:
    - They worked intensively with first-year teachers, providing support above what BTSA normally provided.
    - Some stakeholders were concerned about this focus on first-year teachers, since the program was originally conceptualized to support more experienced teachers.
  - The role was fluid throughout the year:
    - Flexibility was good for working with teachers with varied needs and in varied settings.
    - However, some Full-time Master Teachers wanted more clarity about the goals of the program, and their role in schools.

## The enacted Master Teacher role:

### *Demonstration and 0.2 release Master Teachers*

- Program goals were flexible and changed over the course of the year.
  - Demonstration Master Teachers were initially advised to make their classroom available for observation.
    - However, due to lack of success in this model, the role of Demonstration Master Teachers changed into more of an active leadership role focused on equity.
    - Demonstration Master Teachers were given substitute hours and resources to facilitate collaboration with other teachers.
  - Master Teachers with 0.2 release were directed to work mostly with new teachers.
  - Program was flexible, but many Master Teachers wanted more guidance.

“I would not reapply to [be a Master Teacher]...It was a little un-needed stress or extra work because it wasn't defined, so I had to spend more time figuring out what I was going to do.”  
(Master Teacher, Case study)

## The enacted Master Teacher role: *Demonstration and 0.2 release Master Teachers*

There was variation in terms of Master Teachers' roles.

- Most focused on instruction:
  - Observing other teachers, helping in difficult classrooms, helping with particular instructional strategies, providing professional development.
- However, several focused on non-instructional issues:
  - Providing emotional support to new teachers, planning school-wide events (i.e., performances, field trips).
- Some teachers were already playing a leadership role in the school and now had more time and resources to do so as a Master Teacher.
- Many Master Teachers were unclear of their role and how their work interacted with other support roles.
  - There was confusion about how to interact with those in support roles such as BTSA coaches, IRFs, and Vice Principals.
  - Most Master Teachers' work was self-directed, without much collaboration with the principal or other in-school leaders.

“[The Master Teacher program] might have been too hurried to put in place, without really figuring out the kinks of: What does it actually look like? What does a Master Teacher look like at each school site? Should it look the same? Should it look different? And if there's already someone who's supposed to be doing these things, why is there somebody else, then? And if that person's doing these things, what's that person doing now?...It definitely needs to be a little more defined.” (Master Teacher, Case study)

## The enacted Master Teacher role: *Principal and teacher awareness and buy-in*

### □ Full-time Master Teachers

- 88% of principals with full-time Master Teachers in their schools were not aware of their assigned Master Teacher.
  - This may be because Master Teachers only worked with a few teachers directly.
  - Principals who were aware of the role reported that the additional new-teacher support was highly beneficial.

### □ Demonstration and 0.2 release Master Teachers


- All principals were aware of Demonstration and 0.2 release Master Teachers in their schools.
- However, in many schools, the culture was not welcoming of the Master Teacher role.

“...Since I am on the same level as them, it’s almost like my feedback or constructive criticism wasn’t taken real seriously.” (Master Teacher, Case study)

“I’m seriously uncomfortable walking around going, ‘I’m a Master Teacher. Do you want to work with me?’” (Master Teacher, Case study)

## Teachers primarily worked with Master Teachers on issues of instruction

Teachers worked with Master Teachers on issues of instruction, but less frequently spent time in each other's classrooms.




Teachers were asked to report what kinds of things they did with Master Teachers. 54% reported that they went to the Master Teacher with questions. In fewer cases, teachers observed instruction (16%) or were observed (30%).

# **Master Teacher Program: Effect on Outcomes**

### III. Master Teacher Program: Effect on outcomes

## Most reported that Master Teachers' work was aligned with school goals

The majority of principals and teachers found the Master Teacher program to be aligned with the school's improvement strategy.



While both principals and teachers reported that the hours were aligned, principals reported higher alignment.


"I think [the Master Teacher program has] helped somewhat because that's another person to give the message out to teachers. It's someone else; it's another set of eyes. It's another expert to help work with the teachers; it's another person to help complete the mission here." (Principal, case study)

Note: The effectiveness of PD has been shown to be related to teachers' perceptions about the coherence of their experiences, and we use "usefulness" as a measure of coherence. See for example Penuel, et. al (2007).

### III. Master Teacher Program: Effect on outcomes

## However, reported usefulness was mixed, especially among teachers

The majority of principals and teachers reported that the Master Teacher was useful, but many teachers reported low usefulness.



The vast majority of principals think the MT was useful in meeting the schools' instructional goals, but fewer teachers reported that the MT they worked with was useful in helping them meet their *personal* instructional goals.

[The full-time MT] was able to spend entire days in that room, modeling lessons, and entire days with the teacher planning. And I would not have been able to do that, neither would the IRF, because we're working with the rest of the staff. (Principal, case study)

Note: The effectiveness of PD has been shown to be related to teachers' perceptions about the coherence of their experiences, and we use "usefulness" as a measure of coherence. See for example Penuel, et. al (2007).



# **Master Teacher Program: Lessons from First Year Implementation**

## Master Teacher program has promise, but faces many barriers

- Overall, there is broad support for the program from school sites and district stakeholders.
  - The kind of teacher leadership embodied by the Master Teacher program has potential for changing teacher practice and improving student outcomes.\*
- However, the program faces many barriers:
  - Teachers selected as Master Teachers lacked training in teacher leadership.
  - There was a lack of coherence across different programs, and MTs were not coordinated with different support roles within schools.
  - School norms and culture do not always support teacher leadership roles.
    - There was resistance to elevating some teachers to leadership roles.
    - Teachers were not accustomed to being observed and advised by peers.
    - Master Teachers were not comfortable asserting themselves in the role.
- First year implementation exacerbated these challenges:
  - Condensed timelines, problems with recruitment and selection of MTs, and lack of buy-in from principals made it harder for MTs to play a productive role.

# **The Quality Teacher and Education Act: First Year Report**

## ***Whole-School Rewards***

## Primary Study Considerations

- District-level policy implementation
  - How was the Whole-School Reward program designed after QTEA's passage?
    - Did design of the Whole-School Reward program in the first year of implementation serve QTEA's intended goals?
  - How was the Whole-School Reward program implemented at the district level (by program administrators)?
- QTEA in schools
  - Were principals and teachers aware of the rewards?
  - Were schools aware of their likelihood of winning the rewards?
  - Were schools working toward winning the rewards?
- Effect on outcomes
  - Did the Whole-School Reward program motivate school improvement?
- Lessons from first year implementation

# **Whole-School Rewards: District-level Policy Implementation**

## Program was not rolled out in 2009-10

- The Whole-School Reward program was not implemented in 2009-10.
- There has been a lot of discussion about program design and implementation, but no decisions.
- This policy element lacks a champion:
  - The person responsible for implementation left the district and, due to more pressing priorities, his replacement did not take ownership immediately.
- There is a lack of agreement on program goals:
  - Which metrics should be used to determine the rewards:
    - Metrics discussed include value-added approaches, measures of student engagement and achievement, school climate, participation in clubs, improving the drop-out rate, grade point average, school-specific metrics.
    - Many of the discussed measures would require extensive development and testing to be available for use.
  - Whether rewards should vary by school size or level:
    - \$30,000 can be a lot of money or not very much depending on school size.
    - There was discussion about whether rewards should be decided within school level, or be provided only to targeted schools.

## Concerns about program integrity

- There was a lot of money in unexpended funds from the first year.
  - Some stakeholders are concerned that the money must be spent in order to “maintain any kind of credibility with what we’re supposed to do.” (Case study)
- There are concerns that the program must be rolled out before the school year begins.
  - Stakeholders believe that implementation decisions must be made early so that teachers and principals know what they are working toward.
- Due to delayed implementation, there is no awareness of this program at the school sites.
  - When asked in the interviews, principals were not aware that this program existed.

# **Whole-School Rewards: Lessons from First Year Implementation**



## Without clear goals and a clear champion, program did not get off the ground

- No single person (with time and interest) was held responsible for program implementation.
- There were no clear timelines for program rollout.
- Decisions have not been made regarding basic program design; this has led to the inability to move discussions from brainstorming to action.
- Program goals are still undefined:
  - A focus on the use of not-yet-existing metrics has stalled short-term implementation.
- Because the program was not implemented or publicized, there is no teacher or principal awareness.

# **The Quality Teacher and Education Act: First Year Report**

## *Peer Assistance and Review*

## Primary Study Considerations

- District-level policy implementation
  - How were changes to the PAR program implemented at the district level (by program administrators)?
  - Did first year implementation serve QTEA's intended goals?
- QTEA in schools
  - Are principals and teachers aware of the changes to PAR?
  - Have principals and teachers been affected by the changes?
  - What barriers exist to the effective use of PAR?
- Effect on outcomes
  - How many teachers were affected by the changes to PAR as a result of QTEA?
- Lessons from first year implementation

# **Peer Assistance and Review: District-level Policy Implementation**

## How QTEA changed PAR:

### *General overview*

- PAR is the district's existing mechanism for supporting and removing (if necessary) underperforming teachers.
- There is a general sense among stakeholders that PAR changes may be the most meaningful aspect of QTEA, by increasing teacher support and accountability:
  - Easier entry
    - Teachers can be referred to PAR through “needs improvement” ratings in addition to “unsatisfactory” ratings, enabling more teachers to get support (at a higher performance level).
  - Harder exit
    - The standard for successful completion after PAR participation was raised, meaning that under-performing teachers may be moved to dismissal more easily.
  - No re-entry
    - Teachers who have participated in PAR before (and completed the program successfully) will be moved to dismissal if referred again.
  - Voluntary participation
    - Teachers can voluntarily participate in PAR (without the evaluative aspect). The length of their participation varies and can start at any time during the year.

# How QTEA changed PAR:

## *Specific changes*

Before	Changes as a result of QTEA
Annual (or biannual) review by principal using the SF teaching standards as part of the regular review process.	<i>No change</i>
A teacher enters PAR if s/he receives an “unsatisfactory” summary evaluation, or if s/he “needs improvement” for two consecutive years. A teacher can also be referred by other teachers through the Union Building Committee (UBC).	In addition, teachers enter PAR if they “need improvement” for two consecutive <i>semesters</i> .
Teacher receives coaching and weekly visits from a district PAR coach for one year.	<i>No change</i>
The teacher participates in PAR for one year. During this time, the PAR panel (which is composed of representatives selected by district and union leadership) reviews the teacher’s case in an ongoing manner. At the end of the year, if the teacher meets standards on each of 31 competencies, s/he exits PAR successfully. If a teacher fails to meet standards, the district is free to exercise its legal option to dismiss the teacher.	In order to exit PAR, a teacher must additionally be “proficient” on all seven agreed-upon elements of the SF teaching standards.
For a teacher who exits PAR successfully, s/he could re-enter PAR the very next year if the evaluation rating was once again “unsatisfactory.”	A teacher who has exited the PAR program and subsequently receives an “unsatisfactory” notice may be moved to dismissal.
-	Teachers can voluntarily participate in PAR (without the evaluative aspect).

## The central office's role in implementation

- The PAR panel, which is a joint effort between UESF and the central office, is responsible for referring teachers to PAR (after administrator evaluation) and evaluating their progress.
- Implementation of specific program elements:
  - Easier entry – Teachers who had received two “Needs Improvement” ratings were referred as early as Fall 2009.
  - Harder exit – The harder exit provision was implemented in 2009-10, and teachers were held to a higher standard for program completion.
    - Due to confusion in contract language, teachers participating in 2008-09 were held to the prior standard.
  - No re-entry – Teachers participating in PAR in 2008-09 or later will be denied re-entry (and moved to dismissal) if referred again.
    - There was confusion on this point, as district leaders expected this provision to affect any teacher who had ever participated in PAR, not just those who had participated after QTEA's passage.
  - Voluntary participation – Teachers participated voluntarily in 2009-10.
    - However, stakeholders disagreed on whether voluntary PAR was designed to serve satisfactory teachers or those receiving low evaluations.
- To support these changes, 2 additional coaches were added (although QTEA provides funding for up to 5).

# **Peer Assistance and Review: QTEA in Schools**




## Awareness:

### *Principal and teacher familiarity with PAR*

Overall, principals were familiar with PAR, but teachers had much lower familiarity.

Teacher and Principal Reported Familiarity with PAR




Source:  
2010 Stanford Teacher Survey (N=1513)  
2010 Stanford Principal Survey (N=88)  
Chi-square = 119.03, p = 0.00

99% of principals reported that they were at least “somewhat familiar” with PAR, compared to only 57% of teachers. This lack of familiarity amongst teachers could have a strong impact on their use of PAR (for voluntary purposes or in referring other teachers).

## Awareness:

### *Principals' awareness of PAR changes*

Principals were not generally aware of the changes as a result of QTEA, but those who knew were those who had used PAR before.



Has not used PAR (N=46)  
Used PAR in past 3 years (N=40)

Source: 2010 Stanford Principal Survey  
\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

When asked about the changes as a result of QTEA, principals who had used PAR in the past three years were more aware than those who had not used PAR during this time, though awareness was still low. For example, of those who had used PAR in the past, only 31% knew about easier entry and 33% knew about harder exit.

## Principals' perceptions of changes to PAR: *QTEA's changes and first year implementation*

- The principals who were aware of the changes to PAR frequently had teachers that they hoped would be affected.
  - They were optimistic about the potential of the changes:
    - Easier entry: principals hoped more teachers could now receive the support needed.
  - However, some principals were frustrated when their expectations were not met:
    - Harder exit: Some principals were expecting a move to dismissal (after the 2008-09 school year) that did not happen due to the delay in the implementation of this element.
    - No re-entry: Principals had referred teachers who had participated in the past, but these people were not moved to dismissal as they expected (because they participated prior to 2008-09).

“What’s happened is with Prop A funds, we’re able to service more people. Before, we just took the really bad cases.” (Principal, case study)


“[When I referred a teacher to PAR], I wasn’t happy with the outcome. They let the teacher out. For that year, the district and the union worked out an agreement for that year only basic would be sufficient to get out of PAR.” (Principal, case study)

“[The teacher I referred to PAR] never got the 90-day notice. That never happened the way that HR said it was going to happen. They told me to follow these steps and that I would get a certain result; and I followed those steps and didn’t get that result.” (Principal, case study)

# Principal and teacher perceptions of PAR:

## *General reports from the survey*

Both teachers and principals report that there is a stigma associated with participating in PAR. However, most principals also see PAR as a mechanism for helping teachers.



A majority of both principals and teachers report that there is a stigma associated with participating in PAR (70% and 54%, respectively), but principals believe more strongly than teachers that PAR can help improve teacher practice (76% and 45%, respectively).

# Principals' perceptions of PAR:

## *General reports from the case study*

- Many principals reported that PAR is a very effective program.
- However, some principals find PAR to be ineffective in either improving or removing low-performing teachers:
  - In principals' experience, teachers are only better in the year of participation.
  - As a removal device, principals have found PAR to be ineffective.
    - Due to evaluation and support cycles, the process takes too long.
    - Principals do not feel supported in their efforts.
    - Principals feel that PAR takes up too much of their time.
    - Ultimately, principals have found that teachers are not removed from the school (due to delays or complications with the termination process).
  - Thus, many principals think there are better ways than PAR to remove underperforming teachers from their school and are hesitant to refer teachers.

"I really love the [PAR] process, and I think it's worked for a teacher that I've put into PAR – he really improved." (Principal, case study)

"The question is when he's not in the PAR program, [is he] going to slip back to these practices?" (Principal, case study)

"Every year, I have to decide which students I'm going to sacrifice in this [teacher's] class, which is really, really tough." (Principal, case study)

"When I went through that whole PAR process last year and went to the hearings, I felt like I was on trial. It was really bad. And it was really discouraging." (Principal, case study)


"[Having a teacher in PAR] took up a lot of my time...: Documenting every thing that was happening in the classroom; going to the PAR panel meetings; meeting with the PAR coach; reviewing her lesson plans extensively." (Principal, case study)

"I'm not too happy with the PAR program, and I don't believe that it will help...At the end, they're back at your school." (Principal, case study)

"I've found much more success with counseling [teachers out]... I don't want to put in the time that PAR takes." (Principal, case study)

# Barriers to principals' effective use of PAR: *Principals do not give low evaluation ratings*

Despite the fact that principals report that teachers often do not meet their expectations, evaluation ratings are high across-the-board.




In the 2008-09 school year, only 0.72% teachers received an “unsatisfactory” rating, and only 1.90% received “needs improvement.”\* However (as shown left), principals report that *many* of their teachers are not meeting their expectations.

\*Source: Analysis of SFUSD Administrative Data 2008-09.

## Barriers to principals' effective use of PAR: *Principals use PAR for removal, not improvement*

Of principals who have sent teachers to PAR in the past three years, 51% did so to remove that teacher from the school.



24% of principals referred a teacher to PAR because the teacher might improve, 11% because PAR coaches give support they cannot give, 8% because they hope the PAR coach's evaluation would validate their own, and 5% because they had seen other teachers improve.

## Barriers to principals' effective use of PAR: *Principals use PAR for removal, not improvement*

53% of principals plan to send their lowest-performing teacher to PAR, but these are most often teachers the principals view as recalcitrant.

<i>Is this teacher someone...</i>	Yes
...you would like to remove from your school?	95%
...you think should leave the teaching profession?	83%
...you think is ineffective and <i>could not</i> improve?	55%
...you think is ineffective but <i>could</i> improve?	35%

Source: Stanford 2010 Principal Survey (N=40).

40 principals would like to refer their lowest-performing teacher to PAR. In 95% of these cases, the principal would like to “remove this person from the school.” In only 35% of cases is the principal referring a teacher to PAR who s/he “thinks is ineffective but could improve.”



## Barriers to teachers' effective use of PAR:

### *Voluntary participation*

- Teachers are hesitant to volunteer to participate in PAR:
  - When asked if they would voluntarily participate, 64% said “no”, 26% said “maybe” and 10% said “yes.” (Teacher survey)
- Teachers have varied reasons for not wanting to volunteer:
  - Stigma associated with PAR.
  - Fear of being evaluated.
  - Feeling that they don't need additional help (due to consistent high evaluations).
  - Lack of familiarity with the program.

“I would probably volunteer myself for it. I think it would be cool. I personally would love people coming in to my classroom and watching me teach, to tell me what I can do better.” (Teacher, case study)


“I think [PAR] has a bad rap. I think if it was called something else and I get to have a one-on-one coach and I get to learn all these great new ways to be a better teacher, that would be fabulous, I would love it. But it has these connotations, like if you're a PAR teacher, then it's considered to be a negative thing. So, would I love to have a one-on-one coach? Definitely. But would I want it to be called PAR? No, to be honest.” (Teacher, case study)

“I think that, especially because the main purpose that this is an evaluation process, I think that unless there is a problem where the administration is saying something about my teaching, I wouldn't feel like I should go to that.” (Teacher, case study)

“Would I ever consider [voluntary PAR]? Currently, no... I have always had good evaluations. I haven't felt that I need to have a coach.” (Teacher, case study)

## Barriers to teachers' effective use of PAR: *Referral of other teachers*

58% of teachers report that there are teachers in their school who are “not performing up to a high enough standard.”\*



PAR allows for referral of other teachers through the Union Building Committee (UBC) representative. Despite this, only 33% of teachers who report having low-performing teachers in their schools would refer other teachers to PAR.

\*Source: Stanford 2010 Teacher Survey; includes only teachers familiar with PAR.

## Barriers to teachers' effective use of PAR:

### *Elaboration on why they do not refer other teachers\**

- Teachers feel that evaluating and monitoring other teachers is the administrator's job (50%).  
"I don't feel it is my place to monitor my peers. It is the job of the administrators."
- Teachers feel that referring others is "tattling" and fear retaliation (21%).  
"It would be viewed as undermining a colleague, and would come back to bite me later."
- Teachers are not confident evaluating other teachers' practice since they do not often have the opportunity to observe their classrooms (10%).  
"I am never given the opportunity to observe other teachers in their classrooms. It would not be appropriate for me to refer my peers when I have not observed their teaching."
- Teachers do not think the PAR program is effective in either rehabilitating or removing under-performing teachers (13%).  
"Teachers at my site failed PAR and are STILL employed here, while the young and talented teachers get laid-off or consolidated!"
- Some teachers do not trust the UBC in their school (7%).  
"I would like to, but our UBC rep is one of the people that needs to be referred. He's good friends with the other two I would refer."
- Some teachers would prefer to offer their assistance instead of "going behind teachers' backs" (4%).  
"I would prefer to offer my own support as a fellow teacher. I believe that would be more effective."

\*Source: Stanford 2010 Teacher Survey; includes only teachers familiar with PAR who report that there are low-performing teachers in the school but would not refer another teacher (N=169). Analysis of open-ended response.

# **Peer Assistance and Review: Effect on Outcomes**

## Effect of PAR changes:

### *Teachers served*

Due to PAR changes, more teachers were served in 2009-10.

	2008-09	2009-10
Total caseload (formal referrals)	14	20
Referral in Fall (2 consecutive “Needs Improvement” ratings)	N/A	7
Referral in Spring (2 consecutive “Needs Improvement” ratings)	N/A	2
UBC referral	0	3
Voluntary participation	N/A	7

- 16 participants received support (as a result of QTEA) who would not have before, indicating a change in teacher and principal willingness to seek help.
  - Easier entry
    - 9 participants were referred through this new channel; 7 were referred due to 2 consecutive “Needs Improvement” ratings in 2008-09, and 2 were referred due to “Needs Improvement” ratings in Spring and Fall of 2009.
  - Voluntary participation
    - In the first year of implementation, 7 teachers self-referred into PAR, receiving tailored support for issues the teachers themselves identified. These teachers were allowed to participate whether their prior evaluation ratings were high or low.
- In addition, in 2009-10, 3 teachers were referred to PAR by other teachers (through the UBC representative), compared to none in 2008-09.

## Effect of PAR changes:

### *Teacher outcomes*

As an accountability tool, the effect of PAR remains to be seen, as the accountability measures were not yet in full effect in 2009-10.

- No re-entry
  - In 2009-10, there were 3 participants who had already been in PAR, but they were not affected by QTEA's changes. Per the agreement between SFUSD and UESF, only teachers who participated *in or after 2008-09* will be denied reentry.
- Harder exit
  - Due to the higher standard for successful completion, fewer teachers exited meeting standards (10% in 2009-10 compared to 43% in 2008-09).
  - Of those teachers exiting not meeting standards, 60% of teachers in 2009-10 left the district voluntarily, compared to 50% in 2008-09).
  - However, in 2009-10, 15% of teachers exited not meeting standards and went back to the classroom, receiving a 90-day notice to improve (after which point they can be dismissed). In the history of the PAR program, only 1 teacher has ever been dismissed through this route, and it remains to be seen what the outcome will be for these three teachers.

	2008-09	2009-10
Repeaters (prior to 2008-09)	0 (0%)	3 (15%)
Successful completion (exited meeting standards)	6 (43%)	2 (10%)
Exited not meeting standards and left district voluntarily	7 (50%)	12 (60%)
Exited not meeting standards still teaching (served a 90-day notice)	1 (7%)	3 (15%)

# **Peer Assistance and Review: Lessons from First Year Implementation**

## The overall implementation and effect of PAR

- There is a general sense within the district that PAR changes may be the most meaningful aspect of QTEA:
  - Changes mean that more teachers can be served.
  - Under-performing teachers may be moved to dismissal.
- However, the effective implementation of PAR changes also require the largest cultural shift at the central office and in schools.
- There are significant barriers to the effect of PAR changes:
  - Teachers hesitate to volunteer because of stigma.
  - Principals perceive that PAR is a lot of work for them.
  - Principals do not use low evaluation ratings, even for their low-performing teachers.
  - Principals primarily use PAR for only their lowest performing teachers, and mostly as a removal tool.
  - PAR is not perceived as an effective tool for the removal of teachers, but those teachers who *could* improve are often not referred.



## Moving in the right direction

### *Central office actions can improve implementation*

- Despite these implementation challenges, the process of reform is still moving forward.
- This is the most ambitious element of QTEA, and will likely take time to fully implement and to see effect.
- In future years, the district could help implementation of this element by:
  - Continuing to train principals on how to conduct effective evaluations.
  - Aiming to increase awareness of PAR among teachers and principals with the goal of reducing the stigma associated with the program.
  - Staying true to the promises of QTEA by upholding the provisions that principals expect to be implemented.
    - For example, building capacity for executing 90-day notices.

# **The Quality Teacher and Education Act: First Year Report**

## *Conclusions*

## District-level implementation

1. Program design in the first year was dynamic.
  - As leaders learned, they made changes to implementation.
  - While this indicates capacity for adaptation, the changing program implementation led to a lack of clarity around some program elements.
2. Limited systems for implementation, alignment, and coordination impacted effectiveness.
  - Dedicated staff and resources could have eased the implementation burden.
3. Policy with “something for everyone” adds strain on the central office, as responsibility is widely distributed.
4. There has been a tension between using QTEA to promote reform vs. using funds to protect jobs and programs that had been cut.
5. Hard-to-implement policy elements are also useful in moving the discussion and behavior in the right direction.

# QTEA in schools

## 1. Teacher and principal awareness

- Information about compensation elements has been the easiest to share.
- Elements aimed at improving teaching are less well understood:
  - Principals and teachers were more unclear about the purpose and use of the Master Teacher program, PD hours, and changes to PAR.

## 2. Satisfaction and buy-in

- Overall, there is broad support for QTEA's general provisions from school sites.

## 3. Resource use

- Complex interactions with existing resources and structures affects implementation.
  - For example, PD both supplants and supplements existing programs; 0.2 buy-out for Master Teachers is difficult to implement within school schedules.
- Training on resource use can help improve implementation, satisfaction and buy-in.
  - With more clarity on how to use school site programs (especially Master Teachers and PD hours), principals and teachers may use the resources more efficiently and be more satisfied with their use.

## Effect on outcomes

1. QTEA's reforms seem to be moving in the direction of having an effect on the hypothesized outcomes.
  - Preliminary evidence of benefits of QTEA include improvement in applicant and new teacher perception of wages relative to other job opportunities.
2. However, QTEA may not have a *dramatic effect* as designed.
  - Changes to salary and bonus are relatively small.
  - Teaching improvement interventions are diffuse in nature.
  - Changes to teacher accountability via PAR is a slow process.
3. There are barriers that may interfere with QTEA effect:
  - School culture and norms oppose teacher support and accountability.
  - Principals have limited control over teacher staffing.
  - Shifting QTEA resources year-to-year limits potential effects.
4. QTEA can serve as the foundation for larger programmatic and cultural shifts.
  - This first year study has identified barriers to QTEA effects that can be addressed through larger human capital reforms.

# **The Quality Teacher and Education Act: First Year Report**


## *Appendix*

# Description of survey response rates: *Teachers and Principals*

	Teacher %	Teacher N	Principal %	Principal N
Years as a teacher/administrator in SFUSD				
1st/2nd	56.6	136	.	.
3rd/9th	61.6	1,161	92.9	14
10th+	47.1	1,779	82.4	91
.	52.5	40	.	.
Hard-to-staff				
Not-HTS	51.8	2,346	83.8	80
HTS	56.6	770	84.0	25
Hard-to-fill				
Not-HTF	48.4	1,859	50.0	2
HTF	59.7	1,257	84.5	103
Master Teacher				
No MT	50.5	1,947	86.1	79
MT	57.8	1,002	76.9	26
.	52.1	167	.	.
School Level				
Elem	48.2	1,279	81.0	63
K-8	55.9	211	75.0	8
MS	58.1	487	92.3	13
HS	55.8	962	94.7	19
.	53.7	177	50.0	2


Note: Differences in response rate across all areas are significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level for teachers. No differences are significant for principals.

# Description of survey respondents: *Applicants*





# Description of survey respondents: *Applicants*



## Note on “other”: Teachers’ reasons for leaving in 5 years or fewer in 2010

- Many more teachers selected “other” in 2010 than in 2008. Of the teachers, who selected “other” in 2010, their reasons were:
  - Retirement (29%)
  - Personal/family reasons (23%)
  - Frustration with administration and policy (22%)
    - Budget cuts and uncertainty (5%): “I have received a pink slip every year that I have worked for this district. This year I fully expect to be laid off. One just gets tired. I don't feel valued.”
    - Frustration with central office administration (7%): “I want to work where there is accountability, this district is ridiculous: downtown no one answers calls or emails in a timely fashion (minimum of a week to respond, always leaving a voicemail when you call) and there is never clear accountability.”
    - Frustration with district-level support of teachers/classrooms (4%): “SFUSD is harder to work for every year: top-down management, disrespectful of classroom teachers, out of touch with the school sites and the day to day realities of teaching and learning.”
    - Job is too hard (5%): “Teaching is 2 full-time jobs. We need MORE teachers and support staff for it to be sustainable.”
    - School administration (1%): The “competence of my superiors” and “qualified leadership” are important to teachers.
  - Career change (16%)
  - Commute/geographic location (9%)

## Detail on measure used for “teacher collaboration”

- This school year, how often did you do each of the following. Response options were: never (0), once (1), twice (2), 3-4 times (3.5), 5-9 times (7), 10 or more times (12).
  - Visit another teacher’s classroom to watch him or her teach.
  - Have a colleague observe your classroom.
  - Receive meaningful feedback on your teaching practice from colleagues
  - Invite someone to help your class.
  - Go to a colleague to get advice about an instructional challenge you faced.
  - Receive useful suggestions for curriculum material from colleagues.
- An sum score was created (mean = 29.50), indicating that the average teacher engages in the types of collaboration specified on average 29.50 times per year.

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