

The Micropolitics of Educational Inequality: The Case of Teacher–Student Assignments

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Abstract

Politics of education researchers have long recognized the role of micropolitics in school decision-making processes. We argue that investigating micropolitical dynamics is key to an important set of school decisions that are fundamental to inequities in access to high-quality teachers: assignments of teachers and students to classrooms. Focusing on the intraorganizational political power of experienced teachers, our analysis of survey and administrative data from a large urban district suggests that more experienced teachers have more influence over which students are assigned to their classrooms. By a variety of measures, we also find that more experienced teachers are assigned fewer disadvantaged students, on average, a pattern inconsistent with goals of ameliorating educational inequality by matching more qualified teachers with the students who need them most.

Improving the school performance of students from traditionally disadvantaged backgrounds and closing achievement gaps with more advantaged students are among the most important challenges of modern educational reform. Recognition of the importance of teacher quality for student achievement (Harris & Sass, 2011; Nye, Konstantopoulos, & Hedges, 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004) has focused recent policy efforts aimed at these goals on inequities in the distribution of effective teachers. As one recent example, in July, 2014, Secretary of Education Arne Duncan unveiled the Department of Education’s “50 State Strategy” for ensuring that students of color and from low-income backgrounds have equitable access to qualified teachers as part of future No Child Left Behind waiver renewal decisions (Klein, 2014).

Attention on teacher equity from both policymakers and researchers, however, has focused primarily on the distribution of teachers across schools (Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002). Yet some evidence is beginning to accumulate that teacher quality is also inequitably

distributed *within* schools, with students from less advantaged backgrounds more likely to be placed in classrooms with less qualified or less effective teachers (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2005; Feng, 2010; Kalogrides, Loeb, & Béteille, 2013). This inequitable distribution across classrooms within schools means that policy efforts to move effective teachers into schools with larger numbers of low-achieving students, students of color, or students from low-income backgrounds are likely to go only so far in addressing equitable access to high-quality teaching and, as a result, achievement gaps among student groups.

While across school inequalities are often driven by labor market factors, within-school inequalities in the distribution of classroom teachers have a distinctly political dimension that researchers have overlooked. Scholars of the politics of education have long recognized how micropolitical dynamics in schools inform the setting and implementation of school policies (Malen & Cochran, 2008). Power—formal and informal—is unequally distributed across school actors. To the degree that this power is exercised in ways that affect the distribution of policy “outputs” within the school, there is the potential for within-school political considerations to ameliorate or exacerbate inequalities among students.

We focus in particular on the micropolitical power of relatively experienced teachers. The chain of logic we investigate is this: Teachers who have worked “within the system” over longer periods likely have accrued various forms of social and organizational capital, including respect from school leaders and other actors, understanding of school organizational processes, and relationships within the school community. This greater capital, in turn, can constitute a source of influence in school decisions, including in decisions about how students are assigned to teachers. Research showing that teachers tend to sort over time away from schools with higher concentrations of traditionally disadvantaged students, perhaps because working with those

students or their families is more challenging, raises the concern that teachers might aim to sort in a similar fashion within schools as well (Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004; Lankford et al., 2002). Thus, if more experienced teachers exercise greater influence in assignment decisions, we might expect to see a negative correlation between teacher experience and the fraction of disadvantaged students in a teacher's classroom. If so, given positive relationship between teacher experience and teacher effectiveness (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006; Nye et al., 2004; Rockoff, 2004), the sorting that results from the exercise of power in assignment decisions may well undermine school equity goals.

Although we cannot fully examine this narrative empirically, we shed light on several of its key components using administrative and teacher survey data from a large, urban school district. We ask two research questions. First, we ask whether more experienced teachers indeed exercise more influence in decisions about which students are assigned to their classes, relative to other actors in the school (e.g., the principal). Second, we ask whether more experienced teachers are assigned relatively more advantaged students, compared to less experienced colleagues teaching students in the same grade in that school in the same year. Findings in the affirmative would suggest that teacher experience is an important source of power in school decision-making that teachers can use to affect the distribution of a key resource: themselves. They also highlight the importance of micropolitical dynamics more generally as a worthy area of study for scholars seeking to hone our understanding of educational inequality.

In the next section, we place our look at classroom assignments in the context of research on school micropolitics. We then describe the administrative and survey data we use in our analysis, followed by the results of our examination of our two research questions. The concluding section discusses the implications of our results.

Micropolitics and Teacher–Student Assignments

Although definitions of the concept vary, the study of the *micropolitics of schooling* generally conceives of individual schools as political systems within which organizational actors engage in activities or strategies to influence the allocation of scarce resources (Ball, 1987; Johnson, 2001; Malen & Cochran, 2008; Malen, 1995). Micropolitical perspectives recognize that schools must constantly make choices over the distribution of policy goods and services in an environment in which such resources are often in short supply and focus the analyst on the power or influence relations surrounding choices about how organizational resources are apportioned. Drawing on different sources of influence, including formal authority, capacity to provide supports, and ability to mete out social sanctions, some actors hold more influence over those choices than others, which they can use to pursue their own interests within the organization (Joseph Blase & Anderson, 1995; Hoyle, 1999; Marshall & Scribner, 1991). To some scholars, understanding these interests and patterns of influence means understanding how school decisions “*really* work, not how an organizational chart or a principal’s action plan would like them to work” (Flessa, 2009, p. 331).

Research on school micropolitics has spanned both many categories of influence relations, including those between school personnel and parents or the community, between principals and teachers, among teachers, and others, and examined these power dynamics in each (Malen & Cochran, 2008). We direct attention to a school decision area that has the potential for influence from numerous actors: the assignment of students to teachers within a school. Decisions about assignment have clear potential for the exercise of micropolitical dynamics. Seats in a given teacher’s classroom are a finite resource, and different actors may have

competing interests over how those seats are filled. For example, the perception that seats in some classrooms are more valuable than others—perhaps because a teacher might be perceived as more effective, better at classroom management, nicer, and so forth in comparison to his or her colleagues—may lead parents to seek to influence school personnel to steer their children towards those seats. Principals concerned about the accountability standing of the school may feel accountability pressures that prioritize the achievement of some student groups over others, which may lead them to place some kinds of students with teachers they perceive as more likely to raise student performance. Teachers themselves may have interests in teaching some students or some kinds of students over others, which may lead them to seek to influence which students are assigned to their classrooms. If assignments are a political process, we would expect assignment outcomes to tend to reflect the preferences of whichever groups hold the most influence.

We focus our analysis on the role of teachers. Only a few studies have examined the processes whereby teacher–student assignments are made (Cohen-Vogel, 2011; Grissom, Kalogrides, & Loeb, 2014; Monk, 1987) but evidence suggests that teachers and teacher preferences play an important role (Carey, Farris, & Carpenter, 1994; Kalogrides et al., 2013). Teachers exercise power in a large number of school decision processes, facilitated not only by external policy moves towards greater classroom autonomy (Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, & Harrington, 2014; Malen & Cochran, 2008) but by internal sources of organizational and social capital that teachers accumulate due to their central role in schooling. These forms of capital include expertise about what is best for students, understanding of school decision-making processes, informal relationships with parents and members of the community, teacher

leadership, and the threat of moving on to another school if the teacher becomes dissatisfied (Blase & Blase, 2002; Kalogrides et al., 2013; Malen & Cochran, 2008; Malen, 1995).

Importantly, this capital may take time to accrue, meaning that more experienced teachers are likely to have more of it, giving them more power in school decisions than their less experienced colleagues. In the assignment context, this power may mean securing more favorable teaching assignments by, for example, holding on to courses or grade levels they enjoy teaching. To this point, some prior research finds that veteran teachers are more able to protect their access to more attractive course assignments in high schools, pushing novice teachers into teaching less desirable courses (Finley, 1984). Similarly, teachers may also use this power to alter class compositions, reducing the numbers of students who have behavior problems, learning difficulties, or uninvolved parents, for example, all of which may make the teacher's work more challenging. Such factors correlate with student socioeconomic status, which may underlie the pattern numerous studies have documented that teachers sort away from schools with large numbers of students of color or from low-income backgrounds (Guarino, Santibañez, & Daley, 2006; Hanushek et al., 2004; Lankford et al., 2002). Unfortunately, to the degree it is present, this exercise of political power—rational on the part of teachers who may be seeking to improve their working conditions—will generate an outcome inconsistent with equity goals: more experienced teachers will be systematically assigned to relatively more advantaged classrooms, on average. Because research suggests a positive correlation between experience and teaching effectiveness (Rockoff, 2004), this pattern of assignment can result in further disadvantage for students already more likely to be struggling academically.

This analysis suggests a number of hypotheses about the micropolitical dynamics of the teacher–student assignment process in schools, a full accounting of which is beyond the scope of

the present article. Instead, we provide an initial treatment that analyzes just two hypotheses. The first is that more experienced teachers exercise greater influence in assignments. The second is that this influence indeed results in assignment patterns that are inconsistent with equity goals in the sense that more experienced teachers are systematically assigned more advantaged students when compared to their less experienced colleagues. In the remainder of the article, we draw on unique data from a single large urban district to test these hypotheses.

Data

Our analysis utilizes data from Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS), the largest school district in Florida and the fourth-largest in the United States. The district enrolls approximately 350,000 students, nearly two-thirds of whom are Hispanic. Approximately 65% are eligible for free or reduced price lunch. In M-DCPS, a collective bargaining agreement with the United Teachers of Dade (UTD) governs within-school assignment policies. The agreement specifies that teachers have the right to indicate a preference for teaching assignment (within fields for which they are certified) for the following year, but that scheduling of employees is within principal discretion so long as it is accomplished “in a fair, equitable, and impartial fashion, taking into account seniority and employee preferences” (UTD, 2012).

We make use of two data sources. The first is a rich administrative data set provided to us by the district. The data span ten years, from academic year 2003-04 to 2012-13, and contain information on personnel—including demographic information, education level, and job assignments—and students. Student-level data include race/ethnicity, sex, free/reduced lunch eligibility, English proficiency, scores on state math and tests (which we standardize within

grade level and year), and attendance and discipline information. Course identifiers permit us to link students to their classroom teachers.

The left side of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the teachers in our administrative data sample and the characteristics of the students in their classrooms. Observations are at the teacher-year level, pooled across all available years. The teaching population in M-DCPS is 77% female, 26% black, and 44% Hispanic. The average teacher has 10.3 years of experience in the district.¹ Their classrooms are, on average, 28% black and 61% Hispanic, with 68% eligible for free or reduced price lunch.

We match the administrative data to data from an original survey of M-DCPS teachers we conducted in the spring of 2011. The survey, which had a response rate of 38%, resulted in responses from approximately 8,000 teachers, of which 6,274 could be matched to classrooms and thus retained for our analysis. To assess the representativeness of the surveyed teachers, we compared their characteristics and those of their classrooms to the teachers in the full administrative data sample. This comparison is provided on the right side of Table 1. The characteristics of the two samples are remarkably similar, alleviating to some extent concerns about potential bias arising from nonrepresentativeness of the survey sample.²

We use two sets of questions from the teacher survey. The first asked teachers which actors were involved in the assignment of students to their classroom that year (i.e., 2010-11). A list of actors, including themselves, other teachers in their grade, the principal, and parents, was provided, and respondents indicated involvement with a binary response of *yes* or *no*. Next, teachers were presented with the same set of actors and asked how much influence each one had

¹ Although it may be useful to examine total teaching experience as well, M-DCPS data do not contain reliable indicators of total teaching experience, only experience within the district.

² Note that the administrative data measure personnel experience as number of years worked in the district. On the survey, we instead asked teachers how many years they had worked in the current school, in other schools in the district, and outside the district. Thus the experience measures in the two samples are not directly comparable.

over the assignment of students to their classroom that year. Responses were recorded on a scale of 0 (*not involved/no influence*) to 4 (*a lot of influence*). Both sets of items were developed from a review of the literature on teacher assignment processes (Monk, 1987).

Teachers' responses to both sets of questions are summarized in Table 2. Teachers indicate that assistant principals (APs) are both most likely to participate in assignment decisions (involved 65% of the time) and have the greatest influence, followed by the principal (51% involvement) and school counselors (38% involvement). Students and parents have the least involvement (7% and 8%, respectively) and lowest level of influence, on average.

Do More Experienced Teachers Exercise More Influence in Assignment Processes?

Our discussion of the micropolitics of the teacher–student assignment process argued that the accumulation of political capital could give more experienced teachers more power to influence which students are assigned to their classrooms. To test this hypothesis, we run teacher-level regressions modeling the reported level of assignment involvement or influence for select actors as a function of survey measures of teacher experience, which are finer-grained than the “total experience” measure in the administrative data: years in current school, years in other schools in the district, years outside the district. We estimate the models both without and with school fixed effects; including school fixed effects compares the involvement or influence of teachers at different experience levels *within the same school*, which obviates the worry that any association between assignment processes and teacher experience is the result of unobserved school characteristics. We estimate both sets of models using ordinary least squares; in the case of the binary involvement variable, coefficients from the resulting linear probability model can

be interpreted as showing the marginal change in the probability that an actor is involved in the assignment process for each one-unit change in the independent variable.

Table 3 shows the results for teachers' perceptions of involvement (top panel) and influence (bottom panel) in the assignments of students to their classrooms for themselves, other teachers in their grade, principals, and APs. Odd-numbered models do not include school fixed effects; even-numbered models include them, though their inclusion in most cases does not alter the conclusions drawn. Given this observation, we focus on the school fixed effects models.

The results are broadly consistent with idea that more experienced teachers exercise more power in the student assignment process, though the results make clear that years of experience in the school and not years of teaching experience elsewhere are significant. Model 2 shows that each additional 10 years of experience in the school is associated with a 2% increase in the likelihood that the teacher says he or she was involved in this year's assignment process ($p < 0.001$). This marginal increase is small but substantively important given that only 15% of teachers overall report involvement in assignments. In contrast, models 4, 6, and 8 show that more experienced teachers report significantly *less* involvement of other teachers, the principal, or APs in the assignment of students to their classrooms.

The results for reported influence are similar. Model 10 shows that each additional 10 years of experience in the school is associated with an increase in assignment influence of 0.06 points on a 5-point scale ($p < 0.01$). More experienced teachers also report less influence from other teachers in their grade and APs. The point estimate for principal influence is also negative, though not statistically significant at conventional levels.³

³ In results not shown, we also find that teachers with more experience at their school report more involvement from parents and students in the assignment process. We find no relationship between teaching experience and reports of the involvement of teachers in the grade below, other teachers in their grade, or counselors.

In sum, although the effects are seemingly small in magnitude, the pattern of results from this section suggest that teachers with more experience are more involved in decisions surrounding which students are assigned to their classrooms and exercise more influence in those decisions relative to other actors in the school. The next section asks whether there is evidence that teachers exercise the power that comes with experience to affect student assignments in ways that may have negative implications for equity.

Are More Experienced Teachers Assigned More Advantaged Students?

The outsized influence of more experienced teachers in student assignment processes may systematically affect the distribution of students across classrooms. In particular, if, as we suggested earlier, teachers on the margins prefer to teach classes with fewer disadvantaged students, the assignment influence of more experienced teachers may result in more advantaged classroom compositions for those teachers, on average. To test this hypothesis, we examine numerous measures of potential disadvantage of the students taught by each teacher: the percentage of black, Hispanic, free or reduced priced lunch, and limited English proficient students; the average prior-year math and reading scores of the teacher's students; and the average number of days that students were absent or suspended in the prior year. We run a series of regression models that estimate each of these measures of classroom disadvantage as a function of a teacher's total years of experience in the district, other teacher characteristics (i.e., race/ethnicity, gender, whether the teacher has a Masters degree), and school-by-grade-by-year fixed effects. The following equation describes the model:

$$Y_{itsg} = \beta_0 + T_{itsg}\beta_1 + \pi_{stg} + \varepsilon_{itsg} \quad (1)$$

where the class characteristics of current students for teacher i in year t in school s in grade g , Y_{itsg} , are a function of a vector of teacher level measures (T) and a school-by-year-by-grade fixed effect, π_{stg} . The fixed effects isolate the comparison of a teacher's classroom characteristics by experience to be only among other teachers teaching students in the same grade at that school during that year. To maximize sample sizes, we use only total years of experience in the district so that we can make use of the full administrative data set. In analyses not shown, however, we restrict these models to the survey sample only and distinguish between different types of experience. As above, we find that school-specific experience is the main driver influencing class assignments.⁴

Results are shown in Table 4. As hypothesized, more experienced teachers tend to be assigned fewer disadvantaged students than less experienced colleagues in the same grade and year. Each additional 10 years of experience is associated with .5 percentage points fewer black students in the teacher's classes and .4 percentage points fewer free or reduced priced lunch students ($p < 0.001$ for both). Greater experience is also associated with having students with higher prior-year math and reading scores ($\beta = 0.005$, $p < 0.001$ for both outcomes) and fewer prior-year absences and days suspended. More years of teaching experience are associated with higher percentages of Hispanic and limited English proficient students, which in many contexts would appear inconsistent, but Hispanic students in Miami are in fact the majority group and relatively high-income and high-achieving.

In consideration of the fact that the assignment of students differs substantially across elementary, middle, and high schools, we re-estimated the results in Table 4 separately for each school level. For brevity, these results are omitted, but the coefficients on teacher experience are

⁴ We choose to omit these analyses because they are only based on one year of data and about 6,000 observations while the full administrative sample (using total years of experience in the district) is based on more than 175,000 observations.

very similar across all three grade levels. For example, the experience coefficients in the *percent black students* models are -0.050, -0.028, and -0.055 for elementary, middle, and high schools, respectively. All are statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Similarly, the coefficients in the *average prior reading scores* models are all 0.005 and all statistically significant at the 0.001 level. In other words, it appears that the relationship between teacher experience and the relative disadvantage of the students assigned to a teacher's classes are similar across school levels.

Discussion and Conclusions

In this article, we argue that processes by which schools assign teachers and students to one another constitute a useful case for investigating the micropolitics of student inequality. Teachers with more experience have had opportunities to accumulate organizational, social, and political capital that provide them with sources of influence in school decision-making processes. Our results suggest that indeed teacher experience—particularly more experience in the same school—is associated with greater likelihood of involvement in the process that assigned students to the teacher's classroom that year and more influence in that process, relative to other school-level actors, such as other teachers and members of the school leadership team. Our results are also consistent with the idea that teachers can exercise that influence to affect the composition of their classrooms by such characteristics as race, poverty, and prior achievement. In particular, more experienced teachers are assigned fewer black or low-income students, students with higher incoming math and reading achievement, and fewer prior year absences or days out due to suspension. From an equity perspective, this pattern is concerning. Given evidence that more experienced teachers are more effective, the sorting within schools of more experienced teachers *away* from students with fewer outside-school resources and greater

learning and behavioral challenges are likely to compound student disadvantages rather than address them.

Decision processes that highlight the relative power or influence of different groups often result, unsurprisingly, in disadvantaged groups losing out. The case of teacher–student assignments, however, is nuanced in that traditionally disadvantaged groups (e.g., by race or class) are affected indirectly, collateral damage, in a sense, from resolution of a decision process in which—according to the teacher surveys, which report little input from parents or students—they generally do not participate. Input to assignment decisions instead generally comes from school leaders and other school personnel who, at least on average, do not sufficiently take the interests or needs of disadvantaged student populations into account in resolving the competing demands at play. This failure to advocate for or represent the interests of marginalized groups in organizational decision-making recalls a long political science literature on the “representative bureaucracy” that links the orientation of bureaucrats (in this case, teachers and principals) towards ensuring equity with a more just distribution of policy outputs for traditionally disadvantaged client (i.e., student) populations (Kennedy, 2013). Recognition of and reorientation towards those interests through, for example, school goal-setting and professional development, may be a strategy for bringing student outcomes more into alignment with broader goals of improving equity.

Our analysis here is limited by data constraints. We have data from only one large urban school district, and we do not know that our findings would generalize to other districts. We cannot be sure that the survey instrument reliably or accurately describes assignment processes in the school, and survey response rates were relatively low. Teachers’ perceptions about their involvement or influence may not be accurate, and the association with experience may reflect

other factors that we cannot observe. The systematic assignment of students with low achievement or other measures of disadvantage to inexperienced teachers may reflect other dynamics, such as principals rewarding longer service with more advanced classes taken less often by disadvantage students, or higher teacher turnover in some areas (e.g., special education) that mean that those classes tend to be staffed by newer teachers. Further qualitative investigation may shed additional light or uncover alternative explanations for the patterns we present. Still, our analysis points towards some useful avenues for future work.

Our findings also highlight the importance of future research into assignment processes. Among school talent management functions, teacher assignment is often overlooked as a lever for school improvement, despite the fact that—unlike hiring or retaining effective teachers, which may be difficult for many schools for reasons outside their control—assignment decisions allocate a resource schools already have in hand. Evidence that high-growth schools assign teachers to students more equitably suggests that how schools make this resource allocation decision indeed matters for student outcomes (Loeb, Kalogrides, & Bételle, 2012). Yet the allocation of students to teachers is but one of a large number of distributional decisions in which schools engage on a daily basis. While the interconnections among stakeholder interests and power, the distribution of policy goods, and outcomes evident in this case are significant in their own right, perhaps more important is that they underscore the need for researchers to more systematically examine the role of micropolitics in perpetuating educational inequalities more generally.

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Table 1: Teacher and Characteristics

	<i>Sample:</i> Administrative Data			Survey Data		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
<i>Teacher Characteristics</i>						
Female	0.77	0.42	179179	0.80	0.40	6274
White	0.28	0.45	179182	0.30	0.46	6274
Black	0.26	0.44	179182	0.25	0.44	6274
Hispanic	0.44	0.50	179182	0.43	0.50	6274
Other Race	0.02	0.13	179182	0.02	0.14	6274
MA or Higher	0.37	0.48	179182	0.40	0.49	6274
Years of Experience in Current School	*	*	*	8.52	7.32	6168
Years of Experience in Other Schools in District	*	*	*	4.81	6.69	6141
Years of Experience Outside the District	*	*	*	2.12	4.92	6162
Total Years of Experience in District	10.33	9.16	179182	*	*	*
<i>Class Characteristics</i>						
Proportion Black	0.28	0.33	179092	0.29	0.33	6270
Proportion Hispanic	0.61	0.31	179092	0.62	0.32	6270
Proportion Receiving Free/Reduced Lunches	0.68	0.24	179092	0.74	0.22	6270
Proportion Limited English Proficient	0.18	0.26	179096	0.20	0.27	6272
Average Prior Year Math Achievement	-0.13	0.71	134568	-0.11	0.71	5294
Average Prior Year Reading Achievement	-0.14	0.72	134866	-0.13	0.72	5294
Average Prior Year Days Absent	8.66	4.91	161382	8.49	5.06	6189
Average Prior Year Suspension Days	0.53	1.64	161382	0.49	1.54	6189

Cells marked with * indicate values missing from a given data set. The only experience measure contained in the administrative data files is total years in district. Other experience types were collected via surveys.

Table 2: Involvement in and Influence over Assignments to Teacher's Class This Year

	Mean	SD	N
<i>Involvement in Class Assignments (Yes/No)</i>			
Me	0.15	0.36	5356
Other Teachers in My grade	0.12	0.32	5356
Teachers in the Grade Below	0.16	0.37	5356
Other Teachers in My grade	0.11	0.31	5356
Principal	0.51	0.50	5356
Assistant Principals	0.65	0.48	5356
Counselors	0.38	0.49	5356
Parents	0.08	0.27	5356
Students	0.07	0.25	5356
<i>Influence over Class Assignments (0 = Not involved/no influence; 4 = A lot of influence)</i>			
Me	0.35	0.93	5286
Other Teachers in My grade	0.25	0.78	5289
Teachers in the Grade Below	0.38	0.99	5275
Other Teachers in My grade	0.22	0.72	5281
Principal	1.62	1.76	5082
Assistant Principals	1.91	1.60	5009
Counselors	1.06	1.51	5161
Parents	0.18	0.69	5326
Students	0.15	0.62	5321

Table 3: Relationship between Teacher Experience and Involvement/Influence in the Class Assignments at their School

	<i>Me</i>		<i>Other Teachers in My Grade</i>				<i>Principal</i>		<i>Assistant Principal</i>		
	Overall	W/in Schools	Overall	W/in Schools	Overall	W/in Schools	Overall	W/in Schools	Overall	W/in Schools	
<i>Involved (Yes/No)</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)			
Years of Experience in Current School	0.003 *** (0.001)	0.002 *** (0.001)	-0.001 * (0.001)	-0.002 ** (0.001)	-0.002 * (0.001)	-0.002 * (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	+
Years of Experience in Other Schools in District	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 + (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	*
Years of Experience Outside the District	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	
Constant	0.126 *** (0.009)	0.130 *** (0.010)	0.133 *** (0.008)	0.135 *** (0.008)	0.547 *** (0.013)	0.531 *** (0.012)	0.672 *** (0.012)	0.673 *** (0.012)			***
Number of Teachers	5281	5281	5281	5281	5281	5281	5281	5281	5281	5281	
School Fixed Effect	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	
<i>Amount of Influence (0-4 Scale)</i>	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)			
Years of Experience in Current School	0.007 *** (0.002)	0.006 ** (0.002)	-0.003 * (0.001)	-0.005 ** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	*
Years of Experience in Other Schools in District	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 * (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.009 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.009 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	**
Years of Experience Outside the District	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)	
Constant	0.288 *** (0.024)	0.294 *** (0.025)	0.291 *** (0.020)	0.297 *** (0.020)	1.704 *** (0.047)	1.639 *** (0.044)	1.984 *** (0.043)	1.991 *** (0.041)			***
Number of Teachers	5212	5212	5216	5216	5009	5009	4938	4938	4938	4938	
School Fixed Effect	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	

Number of schools = 351 for each model. Models estimated using ordinary least squares regression. + $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 4: Relationship between Teacher Experience and Class Composition

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	Percent Black	Percent Hispanic	Percent Free/Red Lunch	Percent LEP	Average Prior Math Scores	Average Prior Reading Scores	Mean Number of Absence Days Last Year	Mean Number of Suspension Days Last Year
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Total Years of Experience in District	-0.047 *** (0.003)	0.032 *** (0.003)	-0.042 *** (0.003)	0.021 *** (0.006)	0.005 *** (0.000)	0.005 *** (0.000)	-0.013 *** (0.001)	-0.003 *** (0.000)
Constant	28.019 *** (0.070)	60.495 *** (0.079)	67.605 *** (0.075)	16.011 *** (0.150)	-0.087 *** (0.005)	-0.082 *** (0.005)	8.624 *** (0.025)	0.508 *** (0.006)
Number of School-Year-Grades	18536	18536	18536	18536	13815	13821	16612	16612
Number of Teachers	175246	175246	175246	175246	131760	132052	157930	157930

Models estimated using ordinary least squares regression. + $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < 0.001$. All models include school by grade by year fixed effects as well as controls for teacher race, gender, and whether the teacher has a Masters degree.